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Strudels Attack - Update information (2017, October)

Seeing the new pattern of STRUDELS ATTACK to check the port range in the preliminary connecting stage before launching the attack:

It utilizes the good site of portquiz.net for checking the range of available internet global access, with the usage of java SSH library from good tool jcraft.com with the SSH version tag of: SSH-2.0-JSCH-0.1.54 -

Remote SSH version: SSH-2.0-JSCH-0.1.54

-during the first connection. The upstream IP used are mostly coming from West Europe.

The request for the port range checking can be analyzed as per below illustration:

The SSH compromising method is by the login brute-force attack, with the squence as per below,

2017-10-09 07:40:44 [sid/ip=926,195.154.51.223] login attempt [a/a] failed
2017-10-09 07:40:46 [sid/ip=926,195.154.51.223] login attempt [a/] failed
2017-10-09 07:40:47 [sid/ip=926,195.154.51.223] login attempt [a/a] failed
2017-10-09 07:40:54 [sid/ip=927,195.154.51.223] login attempt [adm/adm] failed
2017-10-09 07:40:56 [sid/ip=927,195.154.51.223] login attempt [adm/] failed
2017-10-09 07:40:58 [sid/ip=927,195.154.51.223] login attempt [adm/adm] failed
2017-10-09 07:41:05 [sid/ip=928,195.154.51.223] login attempt [admin/admin] failed
  :                                                              :
  
2017-10-08 23:27:30 [sid/ip=130,195.154.39.188] login attempt [a/a] failed
2017-10-08 23:27:32 [sid/ip=130,195.154.39.188] login attempt [a/] failed
2017-10-08 23:27:33 [sid/ip=130,195.154.39.188] login attempt [a/a] failed
2017-10-08 23:27:40 [sid/ip=131,195.154.39.188] login attempt [adm/adm] failed
2017-10-08 23:27:43 [sid/ip=131,195.154.39.188] login attempt [adm/] failed
2017-10-08 23:27:44 [sid/ip=131,195.154.39.188] login attempt [adm/adm] failed
2017-10-08 23:27:49 [sid/ip=132,195.154.39.188] login attempt [admin/admin] failed
  :                                                              :

-it will continue the brute until the SSH access is gained, and the attackers is using diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1 ssh-rsa as SSH auth scheme (supporting to the fact of actual tool used too), and keyboard-interactive authenticated access was used before gaining shell to show its human-interraction possibility.

2017-10-09 07:41:06 [sid/ip=928,195.154.51.223] xxx authenticated with keyboard-interactive
2017-10-08 23:27:49 [sid/ip=132,195.154.39.188] xxx authenticated with keyboard-interactive

We can see that both ip of 195.154.51.223 and 195.154.39.188 were accessing the compromised SSH with the same method..

Another trick that was used by attacker is the keepaliving stage to keep SSH channel's connection open to be used to launch the attack afterward. The monitored keepalive functions as per below, see the beacon range of 3seconds and 4seconds used:

2017-10-09 10:33:29 [sid/ip=928,195.154.51.223] got global [email protected] request
2017-10-09 10:33:33 [sid/ip=928,195.154.51.223] got global [email protected] request
2017-10-09 10:33:37 [sid/ip=928,195.154.51.223] got global [email protected] request
2017-10-09 10:33:40 [sid/ip=928,195.154.51.223] got global [email protected] request
2017-10-09 10:33:44 [sid/ip=928,195.154.51.223] got global [email protected] request
2017-10-09 10:33:48 [sid/ip=928,195.154.51.223] got global [email protected] request
2017-10-09 10:33:52 [sid/ip=928,195.154.51.223] got global [email protected] request
2017-10-09 10:33:55 [sid/ip=928,195.154.51.223] got global [email protected] request
2017-10-09 10:33:59 [sid/ip=928,195.154.51.223] got global [email protected] request
2017-10-09 10:34:03 [sid/ip=928,195.154.51.223] got global [email protected] request
2017-10-09 10:34:07 [sid/ip=928,195.154.51.223] got global [email protected] request
2017-10-09 10:34:10 [sid/ip=928,195.154.51.223] got global [email protected] request
2017-10-09 10:34:14 [sid/ip=928,195.154.51.223] got global [email protected] request
2017-10-09 10:34:17 [sid/ip=928,195.154.51.223] got global [email protected] request
2017-10-09 10:34:21 [sid/ip=928,195.154.51.223] got global [email protected] request
  :                          :   :                                 :

2017-10-09 00:20:50 [sid/ip=132,195.154.39.188] got global [email protected] request
2017-10-09 00:20:53 [sid/ip=132,195.154.39.188] got global [email protected] request
2017-10-09 00:20:56 [sid/ip=132,195.154.39.188] got global [email protected] request
2017-10-09 00:21:00 [sid/ip=132,195.154.39.188] got global [email protected] request
2017-10-09 00:21:03 [sid/ip=132,195.154.39.188] got global [email protected] request
2017-10-09 00:21:06 [sid/ip=132,195.154.39.188] got global [email protected] request
2017-10-09 00:21:10 [sid/ip=132,195.154.39.188] got global [email protected] request
2017-10-09 00:21:13 [sid/ip=132,195.154.39.188] got global [email protected] request
2017-10-09 00:21:16 [sid/ip=132,195.154.39.188] got global [email protected] request
2017-10-09 00:21:19 [sid/ip=132,195.154.39.188] got global [email protected] request
2017-10-09 00:21:23 [sid/ip=132,195.154.39.188] got global [email protected] request
2017-10-09 00:21:26 [sid/ip=132,195.154.39.188] got global [email protected] request
2017-10-09 00:21:29 [sid/ip=132,195.154.39.188] got global [email protected] request
2017-10-09 00:21:33 [sid/ip=132,195.154.39.188] got global [email protected] request
2017-10-09 00:21:36 [sid/ip=132,195.154.39.188] got global [email protected] request
  :                          :   :                                 :

So far I spotted these two attacker's IP source that is worth to be blocked from your infrastructure to mitigate these attack to your weak SSH services, like obsolete version of IoT or the weak login IoT devices, GeoIP info is as follows:

{
  "ip": "195.154.51.223",
  "hostname": "195-154-51-223.rev.poneytelecom.eu",
  "city": "",
  "region": "",
  "country": "FR",
  "loc": "48.8582,2.3387",
  "org": "AS12876 ONLINE S.A.S."

  "ip": "195.154.39.188",
  "hostname": "195-154-39-188.rev.poneytelecom.eu",
  "city": "",
  "region": "",
  "country": "FR",
  "loc": "48.8582,2.3387",
  "org": "AS12876 ONLINE S.A.S."
}

Below is the attacker's BGP info, please notice the ASN, prefix and ISP used by the attackers now:

195.154.39.188 | 195-154-39-188.rev.poneytelecom.eu. | AS12876 | 195.154.0.0/16 | AS12876, | ONLINE S.A.S | FR
195.154.51.223 | 195-154-51-223.rev.poneytelecom.eu. | AS12876 | 195.154.0.0/16 | AS12876, | ONLINE S.A.S | FR

Don't hack other people's environment, it is bad and illegal, and you are tresspassing many law and rules.

I hope this post can help to stop the threat and to be its mitigation. If you see these indicators in your traffic log, or your auth log, or in your IoT's SSH/netstat log, that is not good. Precaution should be made to not let them entering your system, like following tips to secure your SSH further:

  • avoid the SSH service on port 22
  • use more secure password
  • not allowing root privilege login from local/global internet
  • use certification (if possible)
  • block unwanted IP or segment network by tcp wrapper or iptables (linux), or ipfw, pf, or ipf for BSD users
  • restrict your sshd rules for the fail attempt
  • apply fail and ban blocking schmee for the fail attempt

#MalwareMustDie