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<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>OONI: Open Observatory of Network Interference</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/</link><description>Recent content on OONI: Open Observatory of Network Interference</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en</language><lastBuildDate>Mon, 09 Dec 2024 00:00:00 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://ooni.github.io/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Censorship Chronicles: The systematic suppression of independent media in Russia</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2024-russia-report/</link><pubDate>Mon, 09 Dec 2024 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2024-russia-report/</guid><description><p>Nearly three years ago, when Russia launched its military operation in Ukraine, it also initiated a parallel campaign: a censorship war targeting independent news media within the country.</p>
<p>Merely a week after the conflict started, Internet Service Providers (ISPs) in Russia <a href="https://ooni.org/post/2022-russia-blocks-amid-ru-ua-conflict/#blocking-of-news-media-websites">started blocking</a> access to several foreign news media websites (such as <a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/search?since=2022-02-03&until=2022-03-07&failure=false&domain=www.bbc.com&probe_cc=RU&only=anomalies">BBC</a> and <a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/search?since=2022-02-03&until=2022-03-07&failure=false&domain=www.dw.com&probe_cc=RU&only=anomalies">Deutsche Welle</a>) and independent Russian news media websites (such as <a href="https://ooni.org/post/2022-russia-blocks-amid-ru-ua-conflict/#meduza">Meduza</a> and <a href="https://ooni.org/post/2022-russia-blocks-amid-ru-ua-conflict/#new-times">New Times</a>). Within a year, independent news media censorship in Russia had become pervasive. In our previous report, we <a href="https://ooni.org/post/2023-russia-a-year-after-the-conflict/#blocked-websites">confirmed the blocking of 139 news media domains</a> in Russia.</p></description></item><item><title>iMAP 2024: State of Internet Censorship in 9 countries</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2024-imap-9-research-reports-southeast-asia/</link><pubDate>Wed, 23 Oct 2024 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2024-imap-9-research-reports-southeast-asia/</guid><description><p>On 22st October 2024, our long-term partner, <a href="https://ooni.org/partners/sinar-project/">Sinar Project</a>, published <strong><a href="https://imap.sinarproject.org/reports/2024">9 new research reports</a></strong> on
internet censorship in Southeast Asia and Hong Kong (China) in collaboration with their
<a href="https://imap.sinarproject.org/">Internet Monitoring and Action Project (iMAP)</a> partners. These reports are based on <a href="https://ooni.org/data">OONI data</a> collected between July 2023 to June 2024 from 9 countries: Cambodia, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam.</p>
<p><a href="https://imap.sinarproject.org/about">Internet Monitoring Action Project (iMAP)</a> aims to establish regional
and in-country networks that monitor network interference and
restrictions to the freedom of expression online in Southeast Asia and Hong Kong (China) in
collaboration with national digital rights
<a href="https://imap.sinarproject.org/partners">partners</a> in these countries.</p></description></item><item><title>Launch: Next generation OONI Run for community-driven censorship testing</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2024-launch-ooni-run-v2/</link><pubDate>Wed, 23 Oct 2024 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2024-launch-ooni-run-v2/</guid><description><div>
<a href="https://ooni.github.io/post/2024-launch-ooni-run-v2/images/image22.png">
<img
src="https://ooni.github.io/post/2024-launch-ooni-run-v2/images/image22_hu17540960861289344737.png"
/>
</a>
</div>
<p><strong>Image:</strong> OONI Run.</p>
<p>Today we are thrilled to announce the <strong><a href="https://run.ooni.org/">launch of OONI Run v2</a></strong>: the next generation version of OONI Run for community-driven censorship testing.</p>
<p>Originally <a href="https://ooni.org/post/ooni-run/">launched</a> in September 2017, <a href="https://run.ooni.org/">OONI Run</a> is a platform for creating mobile deep links that you can share with <a href="https://ooni.org/install/mobile">OONI Probe</a> users to coordinate the testing of websites for censorship. Over the past 7 years, OONI Run has been <a href="https://ooni.org/support/ooni-censorship-measurement-campaigns#examples-of-ooni-censorship-measurement-campaigns">used extensively by community members</a> in Venezuela, Malaysia, India, and around the world as part of their censorship measurement campaigns aimed at monitoring and rapidly responding to emergent censorship events. To improve the OONI Run platform and better meet community needs, we previously conducted an <a href="https://ooni.org/post/2020-06-09-ooni-run-usability-study-findings/">OONI Run usability study</a>, through which we documented extensive community feedback.</p></description></item><item><title>Animation: OONI Partner Gathering 2024</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2024-ooni-partner-gathering-animation/</link><pubDate>Mon, 21 Oct 2024 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2024-ooni-partner-gathering-animation/</guid><description><p>Earlier this year, we had the opportunity to host the <strong>OONI Partner Gathering 2024</strong>: a two-day event in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, where we brought our <a href="https://ooni.org/partners">partners</a> from Asia and the Middle East together to exchange skills and knowledge on internet censorship research. Our goal was to strengthen global and regional collaborations on censorship measurement research and advocacy. We previously published a <a href="https://ooni.org/post/2024-ooni-partner-gathering-report/">report</a> which shares details about the event and its outcomes.</p>
<p>Today, we are excited to share a <strong>new animation</strong> about the <a href="https://ooni.org/post/2024-ooni-partner-gathering-report/">OONI Partner Gathering 2024</a>. This animation provides a glimpse into the event, highlighting the importance of community participation in censorship measurement research. Watch the animation below!</p></description></item><item><title>Job Opening: OONI Backend Developer</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2024-job-opening-ooni-backend-developer/</link><pubDate>Thu, 10 Oct 2024 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2024-job-opening-ooni-backend-developer/</guid><description><p>Are you a backend developer interested in defending human rights on the
internet? We have a job opening for you!</p>
<p>The <a href="https://ooni.org/">OONI</a> team (a non-profit measuring internet censorship
globally) is looking for a dedicated <strong>Backend Developer</strong> to work on our
backend components and infrastructure, and to provide OONI data analysis
support for our <a href="https://ooni.org/reports/">research</a> efforts.</p>
<h2 id="job-description">Job description</h2>
<p>By joining our team, you will work on OONI’s backend components, ensuring the
stable and reliable performance of our infrastructure in response to the
growing global coverage of measurements. You will also provide OONI data
analysis support for OONI <a href="https://ooni.org/reports/">research reports</a> and in
support of the research of our <a href="https://ooni.org/partners">partners</a>.</p></description></item><item><title>OONI Community Interviews: Chido Musodza</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2024-interview-with-chido-musodza/</link><pubDate>Mon, 07 Oct 2024 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2024-interview-with-chido-musodza/</guid><description><p>Today we are excited to publish an interview with <strong>Chido Musodza</strong>, Program Associate, Community Engagement at <a href="https://www.localizationlab.org/">Localization Lab</a>. Chido is passionate about supporting minority language communities through the localization of open-source technology. Localization, on the one hand, makes tech products more inclusive and on the other hand, empowers the development of minority languages and their presence in digital space.</p>
<p>Watch Chido’s interview to learn more about the need for localization and community engagement!</p></description></item><item><title>Russia blocked OONI Explorer, a large open dataset on Internet censorship</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2024-russia-blocked-ooni-explorer/</link><pubDate>Wed, 25 Sep 2024 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2024-russia-blocked-ooni-explorer/</guid><description><p>As of 11th September 2024, Russia has <a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=RU&since=2024-08-01&until=2024-09-25&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=explorer.ooni.org">blocked</a> one of our platforms: <a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/">OONI Explorer</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/">OONI Explorer</a> is one of the largest open datasets on internet censorship around the world. We <a href="https://blog.torproject.org/ooni-explorer-censorship-and-other-network-anomalies-around-world/">first launched</a> this web platform back in 2016 with the goal of enabling researchers, journalists, and human rights defenders to investigate internet censorship based on empirical network measurement data that is contributed by <a href="https://ooni.org/install/">OONI Probe</a> users worldwide. Every day, we publish <a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/">new measurements</a> from around the world in real-time.</p></description></item><item><title>Kazakhstan: TLS MITM attacks and blocking of news media, human rights, and circumvention tool sites</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2024-kazakhstan-report/</link><pubDate>Thu, 19 Sep 2024 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2024-kazakhstan-report/</guid><description><p>In recent years, internet censorship in Kazakhstan has been <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/country/kazakhstan/freedom-net/2023">reported</a> quite extensively. As part of this study, <a href="https://ooni.org/">OONI</a>, <a href="https://ifkz.org/en">Internet Freedom Kazakhstan (IFKZ)</a>, and <a href="https://www.digitalrights.asia">Eurasian Digital Foundation</a> collaborated to investigate internet censorship in Kazakhstan over the past year (between June 2023 to June 2024) through the analysis of empirical network measurement data.</p>
<p>In this report, we share OONI censorship measurement findings and relevant legal context. We found numerous <a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/search?probe_cc=KZ&test_name=web_connectivity&since=2023-06-01&until=2024-06-01&failure=false&category_code=NEWS&only=anomalies">news media</a>, <a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?test_name=web_connectivity&axis_x=measurement_start_day&since=2023-06-01&until=2024-06-01&time_grain=day&probe_cc=KZ&axis_y=domain&domain=www.ipetitions.com%2Cwww.change.org%2Cegov.press%2Camnesty.org.ru">human rights</a>, and <a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?test_name=web_connectivity&axis_x=measurement_start_day&since=2023-06-01&until=2024-06-01&time_grain=day&probe_cc=KZ&axis_y=domain&category_code=ANON">circumvention tool websites blocked</a> in Kazakhstan by means of TLS interference. We also found 7 distinct intermediate certificates signed by 4 distinct root CAs being used to carry out TLS man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks, targeting at least 14 distinct domain names on at least 19 different networks in Kazakhstan. We share more details below.</p></description></item><item><title>OONI Partner Gathering 2024 in Malaysia</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2024-ooni-partner-gathering-report/</link><pubDate>Thu, 25 Jul 2024 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2024-ooni-partner-gathering-report/</guid><description><div>
<a href="https://ooni.github.io/post/2024-ooni-partner-gathering-report/images/image7.png">
<img
src="https://ooni.github.io/post/2024-ooni-partner-gathering-report/images/image7_hu2526202348152306765.png"
title="OONI Partner Gathering 2024"
alt="OONI Partner Gathering 2024"
/>
</a>
</div>
<nav id="TableOfContents">
<ul>
<li>
<ul>
<li><a href="#background-ooni-partners-and-previous-events">Background: OONI partners and previous events</a></li>
<li><a href="#about-the-ooni-partner-gathering-2024">About the OONI Partner Gathering 2024</a>
<ul>
<li><a href="#objectives">Objectives</a></li>
<li><a href="#why-malaysia">Why Malaysia?</a></li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><a href="#sessions">Sessions</a>
<ul>
<li><a href="#day-1--8th-may-2024">Day 1 – 8th May 2024</a></li>
<li><a href="#day-2--9th-may-2024">Day 2 – 9th May 2024</a></li>
<li><a href="#unconference-style-sessions">Unconference style sessions</a></li>
<li><a href="#inclusiveness">Inclusiveness</a></li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><a href="#partner-feedback">Partner feedback</a>
<ul>
<li><a href="#challenges">Challenges</a></li>
<li><a href="#needs">Needs</a></li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><a href="#outcomes">Outcomes</a></li>
<li><a href="#acknowledgements">Acknowledgements</a></li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
</nav>
<p>We are excited to share that on 8th and 9th May 2024, we hosted an in-person <strong>OONI Partner Gathering in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia</strong>. As part of this 2-day event, we brought our <a href="https://ooni.org/partners">partners</a> (primarily from Asia and the Middle East) together to exchange skills and knowledge and strengthen our collaborations on internet censorship research and advocacy.
In this report, we share details about the event and its outcomes.</p></description></item><item><title>OONI Community Interviews: Tawanda Mugari</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2024-interview-with-tawanda-mugari/</link><pubDate>Wed, 26 Jun 2024 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2024-interview-with-tawanda-mugari/</guid><description><p>Today we are excited to publish an interview with <strong>Tawanda Mugari, Co-Founder &amp; Geek in Chief of Digital Society of Africa (DSA)</strong>. Through our <a href="https://ooni.org/partners/digital-society-of-africa/">partnership with DSA</a>, we have had the opportunity to collaborate on research and training activities across southern Africa. Tawanda is a digital security expert, community leader and trainer who has been part of the OONI community for years. Watch Tawanda’s interview to learn more about his important work!</p></description></item><item><title>Tanzania: Surge in online LGBTIQ censorship and other targeted blocks</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2024-tanzania-lgbtiq-censorship-and-other-targeted-blocks/</link><pubDate>Thu, 11 Apr 2024 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2024-tanzania-lgbtiq-censorship-and-other-targeted-blocks/</guid><description><p>This report documents the blocking of LGBTIQ websites and other targeted blocks in Tanzania based on the analysis of <a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?test_name=web_connectivity&axis_x=measurement_start_day&since=2023-12-01&until=2024-01-31&time_grain=day&probe_cc=TZ">OONI data</a>.</p>
<nav id="TableOfContents">
<ul>
<li>
<ul>
<li><a href="#key-findings">Key Findings</a></li>
<li><a href="#introduction">Introduction</a></li>
<li><a href="#methods">Methods</a>
<ul>
<li><a href="#acknowledgement-of-limitations">Acknowledgement of limitations</a></li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><a href="#findings">Findings</a>
<ul>
<li><a href="#blocking-of-lgbtiq-websites">Blocking of LGBTIQ websites</a>
<ul>
<li><a href="#lgbtiq-social-networks">LGBTIQ social networks</a></li>
<li><a href="#lgbtiq-rights">LGBTIQ rights</a></li>
<li><a href="#lgbtiq-news-and-culture">LGBTIQ news and culture</a></li>
<li><a href="#lgbtiq-suicide-prevention">LGBTIQ suicide prevention</a></li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><a href="#blocking-of-websites-that-support-human-rights">Blocking of websites that support human rights</a></li>
<li><a href="#blocking-of-online-dating-websites">Blocking of online dating websites</a></li>
<li><a href="#blocking-of-clubhouse-and-4chan">Blocking of Clubhouse and 4chan</a></li>
<li><a href="#blocking-of-protonvpn">Blocking of ProtonVPN</a></li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><a href="#conclusion">Conclusion</a></li>
<li><a href="#acknowledgements">Acknowledgements</a></li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
</nav>
<h2 id="key-findings">Key Findings</h2>
<p>Our analysis of <a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=TZ&since=2023-12-01&until=2024-01-31&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity">OONI data</a> collected from Tanzania over the last year (between 1st January 2023 to 31st January 2024) reveals the <a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=TZ&since=2023-12-01&until=2024-01-31&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&axis_y=domain&test_name=web_connectivity&category_code=LGBT">extensive blocking of LGBTIQ sites</a>, which correlates with the <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2018/11/bachelet-tanzania-has-duty-protect-not-further-endanger-lgbt-people">escalating discrimination and crackdown on LGBTIQ communities</a> in Tanzania in recent years. Many other blocks identified as part of this study appear to be targeted in nature, as they involve very specific websites, while other (more popular) sites from the same category (e.g. social media, human rights) were found accessible.</p></description></item><item><title>Internet sanctions on Russian media: diverging actions and mixed effects</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2024-eu-sanctions/</link><pubDate>Mon, 25 Mar 2024 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2024-eu-sanctions/</guid><description><p><em>The original post appeared on the blog of <a href="https://www.sidnlabs.nl/en/news-and-blogs/internet-sanctions-on-russian-media-diverging-actions-and-mixed-effects">SIDN Labs</a>.</em></p>
<p>As a response to the Russian aggression against Ukraine, the European Union (EU) imposed sanctions on organisations affiliated with the Russian Federation prohibiting them from broadcasting content in the EU, including online distribution. In a collaborative effort with researchers from the University of Illinois Chicago, Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI), the University of Twente and the University of Amsterdam, we carried out a longitudinal traffic analysis to understand how internet service providers (ISPs) in different EU member states implement these sanctions. We found that the degree of blocking varies widely, both between and within individual EU member states. This raises questions about the effectiveness of the EU sanctions. This blog is a summary of the paper we published last month.</p></description></item><item><title>Year in Review: OONI in 2023</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2023-year-in-review/</link><pubDate>Fri, 22 Dec 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2023-year-in-review/</guid><description><p>As the end of 2023 approaches, we publish this post to share some OONI
highlights from the last year. We also share some of the things we’ll be
working on in 2024!</p>
<nav id="TableOfContents">
<ul>
<li>
<ul>
<li><a href="#new-ooni-non-profit-legal-entity">New OONI non-profit legal entity</a></li>
<li><a href="#new-ooni-project-manager">New OONI Project Manager</a></li>
<li><a href="#new-ooni-measurement-tools">New OONI measurement tools</a>
<ul>
<li><a href="#launched-ooni-probe-web">Launched OONI Probe Web</a></li>
<li><a href="#launched-news-media-scan-app-with-deutsche-welle-dw">Launched News Media Scan app with Deutsche Welle (DW)</a></li>
<li><a href="#building-ooni-run-v2">Building OONI Run v2</a></li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><a href="#new-ooni-explorer-features">New OONI Explorer features</a>
<ul>
<li><a href="#censorship-findings-22-reports">Censorship Findings: 22 reports</a></li>
<li><a href="#domain-centric-pages">Domain-centric pages</a></li>
<li><a href="#network-centric-pages">Network-centric pages</a></li>
<li><a href="#user-feedback-reporting-mechanism">User feedback reporting mechanism</a></li>
<li><a href="#charts-on-internet-outages">Charts on internet outages</a></li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><a href="#research">Research</a>
<ul>
<li><a href="#ooni-research-reports">OONI research reports</a></li>
<li><a href="#ooni-reports-for-isoc-pulse-shutdown-timeline">OONI reports for ISOC Pulse shutdown timeline</a></li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><a href="#community">Community</a>
<ul>
<li><a href="#new-partnerships">New partnerships</a></li>
<li><a href="#new-ooni-outreach-kit">New OONI Outreach Kit</a></li>
<li><a href="#new-ooni-screencasts-and-documentation">New OONI screencasts and documentation</a></li>
<li><a href="#localization">Localization</a>
<ul>
<li><a href="#ooni-explorer">OONI Explorer</a></li>
<li><a href="#ooni-run">OONI Run</a></li>
<li><a href="#ooni-probe">OONI Probe</a></li>
<li><a href="#ooni-documentation">OONI documentation</a></li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><a href="#new-ooni-community-interviews">New OONI Community Interviews</a></li>
<li><a href="#ooni-workshops-and-presentations">OONI workshops and presentations</a></li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><a href="#ooni-verse">OONI-verse</a></li>
<li><a href="#2024">2024</a></li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
</nav>
<h2 id="new-ooni-non-profit-legal-entity">New OONI non-profit legal entity</h2>
<div>
<a href="https://ooni.github.io/post/2023-year-in-review/images/image4.png">
<img
src="https://ooni.github.io/post/2023-year-in-review/images/image4_hu18379814389437255340.png"
title="OONI Explorer"
alt="OONI Explorer"
/>
</a>
</div>
<p>OONI is now a registered NGO in Italy!</p></description></item><item><title>OONI Community Interviews: Ihueze Nwobilor</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2023-interview-with-ihueze-nwobilor/</link><pubDate>Thu, 14 Dec 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2023-interview-with-ihueze-nwobilor/</guid><description><p>Today we are thrilled to publish an interview with <strong>Ihueze Nwobilor</strong>: Senior Programs Officer with <a href="https://paradigmhq.org/team/ihueze-nwobilor/">Paradigm Initiative</a>. Through our <a href="https://ooni.org/partners/paradigm-initiative/">partnership with Paradigm Initiative</a>, we have had the opportunity to collaborate on several research reports examining internet censorship in Nigeria. Ihueze’s work is focused on digital inclusion and on making digital technologies accessible to the under-served communities in numerous African countries, including Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, South Sudan, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.</p>
<p>Since the <a href="https://www.accessnow.org/press-release/nigeria-blocks-twitter-keepiton/">blocking of Twitter in Nigeria in 2021</a>, Ihueze has become an active <a href="https://ooni.org/install/">OONI Probe</a> user and gained a unique experience of using <a href="https://ooni.org/data/">OONI data</a> in his advocacy and government engagement work. Through his advocacy and litigation efforts with Paradigm Initiative, the Twitter ban in Nigeria was <a href="https://www.accessnow.org/press-release/ecowas-court-nigeria-unlawful-twitter-ban/">declared unlawful</a> and access to the platform was restored.</p></description></item><item><title>Launch: New OONI Censorship Findings platform</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2023-launch-ooni-censorship-findings-platform/</link><pubDate>Thu, 30 Nov 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2023-launch-ooni-censorship-findings-platform/</guid><description><p>
<div>
<a href="https://ooni.github.io/post/2023-launch-ooni-censorship-findings-platform/images/ooni-censorship-findings.png">
<img
src="https://ooni.github.io/post/2023-launch-ooni-censorship-findings-platform/images/ooni-censorship-findings_hu17962422820562351912.png"
srcset="https://ooni.github.io/post/2023-launch-ooni-censorship-findings-platform/images/ooni-censorship-findings_hu17956862074008836710.png 2x"
title="Censorship Findings"
alt="Censorship Findings"
/>
</a>
</div>
<strong>Image:</strong> OONI Censorship Findings platform.</p>
<p>Today we are thrilled to announce the launch of the OONI <a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/findings">Censorship
Findings</a> platform!</p>
<p>Internet censorship is frequently being reported around the world, but
how can we verify such events with empirical evidence?</p>
<p>Our <a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/findings">new platform provides short reports</a> on internet censorship around the world based on OONI&rsquo;s <a href="https://ooni.org/data/">open data</a>. With the launch of the platform, we are <strong>publishing 20 reports on internet censorship</strong> that emerged in 2023. In response to emergent censorship events, this
platform will be updated with new reports on an ongoing basis.</p></description></item><item><title>Measure all the Things! IMC Hackathon 2023</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/imc-hackathon-results-2023/</link><pubDate>Fri, 24 Nov 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/imc-hackathon-results-2023/</guid><description><p>On 23rd October 2023, right before the <a href="https://conferences.sigcomm.org/imc/2023/">Internet Measurement Conference
(IMC)</a> 2023, we
co-hosted an <strong>internet measurement hackathon</strong> in collaboration with
the <a href="https://www.internetsociety.org/">Internet Society
(ISOC)</a>,
<a href="https://www.measurementlab.net/">M-Lab</a>, <a href="https://censoredplanet.org/">Censored Planet</a> and
<a href="https://ioda.inetintel.cc.gatech.edu/">IODA</a>.</p>
<p>In this post we would like to share some of the projects that were
developed as part of the hackathon. It was great to see how much was
accomplished in such a short period of time!</p>
<p>The day started with an <a href="https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1DHhGcpCMTbSJE0QKO6ZTSnIPFixLxxBXwZLkqv0wdJA/edit#slide=id.g1723ddbd698_0_18">introduction to the various datasets</a>
from OONI&rsquo;s Arturo, Censored Planet&rsquo;s Armin, IODA&rsquo;s Zach, ISOC&rsquo;s Amreesh
and M-Lab&rsquo;s Lai Yi. Following the brief presentations, the participants
formed teams to work on some of the specific challenges that <a href="https://docs.google.com/document/d/1bmCwU0ZJCu-xKlIBKqh3rdIJLHZ-vS7UCOfHI-0RxVE/edit#heading=h.nhvc5bssegtl">we had
proposed</a>
or came up with new ones.</p></description></item><item><title>OONI Community Interviews: Siti Nurliza</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2023-interview-with-siti-nurliza/</link><pubDate>Mon, 16 Oct 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2023-interview-with-siti-nurliza/</guid><description><p>Today we are thrilled to publish an interview with Siti Nurliza: a talented data analyst and technologist with <a href="https://sinarproject.org/">Sinar Project</a>, one of our most dedicated and long-term <a href="https://ooni.org/partners/sinar-project/">partners</a> who have led OONI censorship measurement efforts in Southeast Asia for more
than 6 years!</p>
<iframe width="560" height="315" src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/DOTjOR7zA2Y" frameborder="0" allow="autoplay; encrypted-media" allowfullscreen></iframe>
<p><a href="https://sinarproject.org/">Sinar Project</a> is a civic tech initiative using open technology, open data and policy analysis to systematically make important information public and more accessible to
the Malaysian people. Over the years, we <a href="https://ooni.org/partners/sinar-project">collaborated</a> with Sinar Project on measuring and reporting on internet censorship in
<a href="https://ooni.org/post/malaysia-report/">Malaysia</a>, <a href="https://ooni.org/post/indonesia-internet-censorship/">Indonesia</a>,
<a href="https://ooni.torproject.org/post/thailand-internet-censorship/">Thailand</a>, and <a href="https://ooni.org/post/myanmar-report/">Myanmar</a>
through the use of OONI tools and data.</p></description></item><item><title>Grindr blocked in Jordan: Shrinking LGBTQ spaces</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2023-jordan-blocks-grindr/</link><pubDate>Wed, 20 Sep 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2023-jordan-blocks-grindr/</guid><description><p>Jordan recently <a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/m/20230808211935.881250_JO_webconnectivity_6b7549126aabe25d">blocked</a> access to <a href="https://www.grindr.com/">Grindr</a> — the world’s largest social networking app for gay, bi, trans, and queer people — adding to the list of social media apps banned in the country, including <a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=JO&since=2023-08-13&until=2023-09-13&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.tiktok.com">TikTok</a> and <a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=JO&since=2023-08-13&until=2023-09-13&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.clubhouse.com">Clubhouse</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=JO&since=2023-08-01&until=2023-09-10&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.grindr.com">OONI network measurement data</a> collected from Jordan suggests that ISPs started blocking access to Grindr on August 8th 2023, and that the block <a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=JO&since=2023-08-01&until=2023-09-21&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.grindr.com">remains ongoing</a>.</p>
<p>This report shares <a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=JO&since=2023-08-01&until=2023-09-10&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.grindr.com">OONI data</a> on the blocking of Grindr in Jordan.</p>
<nav id="TableOfContents">
<ul>
<li>
<ul>
<li><a href="#background">Background</a></li>
<li><a href="#methods">Methods</a></li>
<li><a href="#blocking-of-grindr-in-jordan">Blocking of Grindr in Jordan</a>
<ul>
<li><a href="#ooni-findings">OONI findings</a></li>
<li><a href="#impact-of-the-block">Impact of the block</a></li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><a href="#conclusion">Conclusion</a></li>
<li><a href="#acknowledgements">Acknowledgements</a></li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
</nav>
<h2 id="background">Background</h2>
<p>Jordan is one of the few Middle Eastern countries where consensual same-sex sexual acts are not criminalised. Previously, the colonial-era <a href="https://database.ilga.org/api/downloader/download/1/JO%20-%20LEG%20-%20Criminal%20Code%20Bill%20(1936)%20-%20OR-OFF(en).pdf">Criminal Code Bill (1936)</a> banned same-sex relations, but this was repealed in 1951 with the enactment of the country’s <a href="https://database.ilga.org/api/downloader/download/1/JO%20-%20LEG%20-%20Penal%20Code%20(1951)%20-%20TR(en).pdf">Penal Code</a>. While homosexual conduct is technically legal in Jordan, the General Iftaa Department issued a <a href="https://database.ilga.org/api/downloader/download/1/JO%20-%20JUD%20-%20Fatwa%203670%20on%20Sexual%20Relations%20from%20an%20Islamic%20Perspective%20(2021)%20-%20OR(ar).pdf">religious ruling</a> (Fatwa) in December 2021, declaring that &ldquo;homosexuality is illegal under Islamic law&rdquo;. Such religious rulings are not legally binding, but the General Iftaa Department acts in an advisory capacity to government branches and courts.</p></description></item><item><title>Join us at the IMC 2023 Hackathon on Network Interference using Open Data</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2023-imc-hackathon/</link><pubDate>Mon, 28 Aug 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2023-imc-hackathon/</guid><description><p>Are you attending the <a href="https://conferences.sigcomm.org/imc/2023/">Internet Measurement Conference (IMC)
2023</a>?</p>
<p>Join us at the <strong><a href="https://conferences.sigcomm.org/imc/2023/hackaton/">IMC Hackathon on Network Interference using Open
Data</a></strong> on Monday, <strong>23rd
October 2023</strong>, in Montreal, Canada. The hackathon is organized by the
<a href="https://www.internetsociety.org/">Internet Society (ISOC)</a>, the <a href="https://ooni.org/">Open
Observatory of Network Interference (OONI)</a>,
<a href="https://www.measurementlab.net/">M-Lab</a> and <a href="https://censoredplanet.org/">Censored
Planet.</a></p>
<p>IMC is a yearly academic conference focusing on Internet measurement and
analysis. The conference is sponsored by ACM SIGCOMM.</p>
<p>This IMC Hackathon will be about exploring, analyzing, and visualizing open
network measurement data with a focus on identifying Internet censorship and
Internet shutdown events.</p></description></item><item><title>Senegal: Social media blocks and network outages amid political unrest</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2023-senegal-social-media-blocks/</link><pubDate>Tue, 01 Aug 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2023-senegal-social-media-blocks/</guid><description><p>Violent protests <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/gallery/2023/6/4/death-toll-mounts-as-unrest-flares-in-senegal">erupted</a> in Senegal on 1st June 2023 over the sentencing of opposition leader Ousmane Sonko. On the same day, <a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=SN&since=2023-05-10&until=2023-06-30&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=whatsapp">OONI data</a> collected from Senegal showed that ISPs started blocking access to several instant messaging apps and social media platforms (which were also <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-65788534">reported</a> by several news outlets). Those blocks appear to have been in place for a week (until 7th June 2023). Meanwhile, Cloudflare observed <a href="https://radar.cloudflare.com/as37649?dateStart=2023-06-03&dateEnd=2023-06-10">three disruptions</a> to traffic from AS37649 (Free/Tigo), and two disruptions at Sudatel Senegal during this period. Following the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/30/senegals-ousmane-sonko-charged-with-fomenting-insurrection">arrest</a> of Ousmane Sonko on 28th July 2023, the Senegalese Ministry of Communication, Telecommunications and the Digital Economy issued another shutdown order on 31st July 2023 to cut off mobile internet access.</p></description></item><item><title>China is blocking OONI</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2023-china-blocks-ooni/</link><pubDate>Fri, 28 Jul 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2023-china-blocks-ooni/</guid><description><div>
<a href="https://ooni.github.io/post/2023-china-blocks-ooni/images/image4.png">
<img
src="https://ooni.github.io/post/2023-china-blocks-ooni/images/image4_hu9808324584859745139.png"
title="China blocks OONI"
alt="China blocks OONI"
/>
</a>
</div>
<p>We usually <a href="https://ooni.org/reports/">report</a> on how other services are blocked. This time, we’re reporting on how our own services are blocked.</p>
<p>China recently started blocking access to our website (<code>ooni.org</code>) and censorship measurement app (<a href="https://ooni.org/install/">OONI Probe</a>).</p>
<p>This is not too surprising, given the fact that our work and tools center around measuring and exposing internet censorship (in <a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/">China and around the world</a>), and China has one of the most advanced and pervasive levels of internet censorship in the world. However, we’re not sure why China decided to start blocking us at this specific moment in time (as opposed to years ago), given that OONI measurements have been <a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/country/CN">collected from China</a> since 2014. The timing of OONI blocking in China (which seems to have started on 7th July 2023) leads us to think that it might be related to our recent <a href="https://twitter.com/OpenObservatory/status/1673659531639894019">reporting on the blocking of F-Droid</a> in China in late June 2023. But we also reported on the <a href="https://ooni.org/post/2019-china-wikipedia-blocking/">blocking of Wikipedia in China</a> back in 2019 (among other <a href="https://ooni.org/reports/">reports</a> on censorship observed in China), and China did not block our services at the time.</p></description></item><item><title>New OONI Explorer features for investigating internet censorship through open data</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2023-new-explorer-features/</link><pubDate>Tue, 30 May 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2023-new-explorer-features/</guid><description><p>We’re excited to share that <a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/">OONI Explorer</a> includes new features for investigating internet censorship worldwide based on open data.</p>
<p>Specifically, these features include:</p>
<ul>
<li>New <a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/domains">domain-centric pages</a>;</li>
<li>New <a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/networks">network-centric pages</a>;</li>
<li>New “internet outage” charts (integrating IODA, Google traffic, and Cloudflare Radar data), available in each <a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/countries">country-specific</a> and <a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/networks">network-specific</a> page;</li>
<li>New user feedback reporting mechanism, available through the “Verify” button in the banner of each OONI measurement page.</li>
</ul>
<p>In this blog post, we share information about these new features.</p></description></item><item><title>Job Opening: OONI Project Manager</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2023-job-opening-ooni-project-manager/</link><pubDate>Tue, 02 May 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2023-job-opening-ooni-project-manager/</guid><description><p><strong>This job posting is now closed. Any applications received after 2023-06-28 will not be considered</strong></p>
<p>Are you a project manager interested in defending human rights on the
internet? We have a job opening for you!</p>
<p>The <a href="https://ooni.org/">OONI</a> team (a non-profit measuring
internet censorship globally) is looking for a dedicated <strong>project
manager</strong> to help us manage our software development work.</p>
<p>We will be reviewing applications on a rolling basis.</p>
<h1 id="job-description">Job description</h1>
<p>By joining our team, you will help ensure that our software projects are
on track, supporting a global community that relies on our tools for
measuring and fighting internet censorship.</p></description></item><item><title>Brazil: OONI data on the blocking of Telegram</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2023-brazil-telegram/</link><pubDate>Fri, 28 Apr 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2023-brazil-telegram/</guid><description><p>Encontre a versão em português do relatório localizada pela <a href="https://codingrights.org/">Coding Rights</a> aqui: <a href="https://codingrights.org/library-item/brasil-dados-da-ooni-sobre-o-bloqueio-do-telegram/">https://codingrights.org/library-item/brasil-dados-da-ooni-sobre-o-bloqueio-do-telegram/</a></p>
<p>Two days ago, on 26th April 2023, Brazil started <a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=BR&since=2023-03-29&until=2023-04-29&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=telegram">blocking</a> access to Telegram.</p>
<p>On the same day, a federal judge in Brazil <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/brazil-court-orders-temporary-suspension-of-telegram-over-neo-nazi-probe/a-65446224">reportedly</a> ordered the temporary suspension of Telegram in response to the messaging service’s alleged failure to share all information on neo-Nazi chat groups requested by the police. This information was <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/26/briefing/brazil-telegram-ban.html">reportedly</a> requested as part of a school attacks inquiry, as Brazilian authorities investigate neo-Nazi groups that are believed to have used Telegram to incite school attacks. However, Telegram’s CEO <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2023/04/27/telegram-brazil-block/2ec1c1de-e554-11ed-9696-8e874fd710b8_story.html">claims</a> (<a href="https://web.telegram.org/z/#-1006503122">on his Telegram channel</a>) that it’s impossible for them to comply with the order, as the judge requested data that is not feasible for them to obtain.</p></description></item><item><title>Throttling of news media amid Kazakhstan’s 2022 presidential election</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2023-throttling-kz-elections/</link><pubDate>Fri, 28 Apr 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2023-throttling-kz-elections/</guid><description><p>Snap presidential elections were held in Kazakhstan in November 2022, following a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-59927267">wave of unrest</a> that started in January 2022. Following the victory of incumbent president Tokayev, early legislative elections were held in March 2023.</p>
<p>Through the analysis of OONI data, we observe the throttling of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) Kazakhstan&rsquo;s service websites in Kazakh and Russian (<a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=KZ&since=2022-09-19&until=2023-04-19&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.azattyq.org">www.azattyq.org</a> and <a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=KZ&since=2022-09-19&until=2023-04-19&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=rus.azattyq.org">rus.azattyq.org</a>) in Kazakhstan, starting from 27th September 2022 and lasting until at least 11th April 2023. We also observe the temporary throttling of <a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=KZ&since=2022-09-19&until=2023-04-19&time_grain=day&axis_x=measurement_start_day&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.currenttime.tv">www.currenttime.tv</a> during Kazakhstan’s 2022 presidential elections.</p></description></item><item><title>Introducing OONI Probe Web</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/introducing-ooni-probe-web/</link><pubDate>Mon, 20 Mar 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/introducing-ooni-probe-web/</guid><description><div>
<a href="https://ooni.github.io/post/introducing-ooni-probe-web/images/image1.png">
<img
src="https://ooni.github.io/post/introducing-ooni-probe-web/images/image1_hu8271175250346792258.png"
title="OONI Explorer"
alt="OONI Explorer"
/>
</a>
</div>
<p>Today, we are excited to announce the launch of <strong><a href="https://probe-web.ooni.org/">OONI Probe Web</a></strong>: a new browser-based tool for measuring the blocking of websites.</p>
<p>We built OONI Probe Web in response to long-term community feedback, requesting a censorship measurement tool that can be run from a browser, without requiring the installation of any software. Our goal is to support rapid response efforts to emergent censorship events.</p>
<p>However, please note that OONI Probe Web is experimental, and what can be measured from a browser is very limited in comparison to what can be measured from an app. We therefore hope that the use of OONI Probe Web encourages further use of the <a href="https://ooni.org/install/">OONI Probe app</a> for more extensive and accurate testing.</p></description></item><item><title>How we're improving OONI data quality: An analysis of failed measurements</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/improving-data-quality-analysis-of-failed-measurements/</link><pubDate>Mon, 13 Mar 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/improving-data-quality-analysis-of-failed-measurements/</guid><description><p>In this blog post, we manually analyse <code>failed</code> OONI measurements to assess why they were classified as such, whether they are symptomatic of censorship, and whether they still carry helpful information for researchers. We focus on measurements from three countries (India, Pakistan, and Indonesia) and outline steps on how we will improve overall data quality.</p>
<ul>
<li>
<p><a href="https://ooni.github.io/post/improving-data-quality-analysis-of-failed-measurements/#background">Background</a></p>
</li>
<li>
<p><a href="https://ooni.github.io/post/improving-data-quality-analysis-of-failed-measurements/#methodology">Methodology</a></p>
</li>
<li>
<p><a href="https://ooni.github.io/post/improving-data-quality-analysis-of-failed-measurements/#results">Results</a></p>
<ul>
<li>
<p><a href="https://ooni.github.io/post/improving-data-quality-analysis-of-failed-measurements/#pakistan">Pakistan</a></p>
</li>
<li>
<p><a href="https://ooni.github.io/post/improving-data-quality-analysis-of-failed-measurements/#india">India</a></p>
</li>
<li>
<p><a href="https://ooni.github.io/post/improving-data-quality-analysis-of-failed-measurements/#indonesia">Indonesia</a></p>
</li>
<li>
<p><a href="https://ooni.github.io/post/improving-data-quality-analysis-of-failed-measurements/#overall">Overall</a></p>
</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>
<p><a href="https://ooni.github.io/post/improving-data-quality-analysis-of-failed-measurements/#limitations">Limitations</a></p>
</li>
<li>
<p><a href="https://ooni.github.io/post/improving-data-quality-analysis-of-failed-measurements/#conclusions-and-future-work">Conclusions and Future Work</a></p>
</li>
</ul>
<h1 id="background">Background</h1>
<p><a href="https://ooni.org/nettest/web-connectivity/">Web Connectivity</a> is a network test that determines whether a web resource is accessible from the network where the user runs <a href="https://ooni.org/install/">OONI Probe</a>. To this end, Web Connectivity measures accessing the resource and compares the measurement results with another measurement performed by a control vantage point. After the measurement, OONI Probe submits a JSON document summarising its findings and the control vantage point findings to the OONI backend. In turn, the <a href="https://github.com/ooni/pipeline/">OONI data processing pipeline</a> classifies all Web Connectivity measurements into four categories:</p></description></item><item><title>OONI measurements show ongoing internet censorship in Azerbaijan</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2023-azerbaijan-internet-censorship/</link><pubDate>Tue, 28 Feb 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2023-azerbaijan-internet-censorship/</guid><description><p>Azerbaijan is known to block access to independent news media websites – we previously <a href="https://ooni.org/post/2021-azerbaijan/">reported</a> on this in July 2021. At the time, we analyzed OONI measurements collected from Azerbaijan between January 2020 to May 2021 and found that ISPs in Azerbaijan were <a href="https://ooni.org/post/2021-azerbaijan/#blocked-news-media-websites">blocking access to several independent news media</a> and <a href="https://ooni.org/post/2021-azerbaijan/#blocked-circumvention-tool-sites">circumvention tool sites</a>. We also found that amid the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-54324772">2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war</a>, ISPs in Azerbaijan <a href="https://ooni.org/post/2021-azerbaijan/#blocking-of-social-media-amid-2020-nagorno-karabakh-war">temporarily blocked access to social media</a> services, and <a href="https://ooni.org/post/2021-azerbaijan/#tor-and-psiphon">attempted to block</a> access to <a href="https://www.torproject.org/">Tor</a> and <a href="https://psiphon.ca/">Psiphon</a>.</p></description></item><item><title>How Internet censorship changed in Russia during the 1st year of military conflict in Ukraine</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2023-russia-a-year-after-the-conflict/</link><pubDate>Fri, 24 Feb 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2023-russia-a-year-after-the-conflict/</guid><description><p>As of today, last year, Russia started its <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-60525350">military operation in Ukraine</a>. This was followed by increased levels of internet censorship, as Internet Service Providers (ISPs) in Russia started <a href="https://ooni.org/post/2022-russia-blocks-amid-ru-ua-conflict/#blocking-of-news-media-websites">blocking access to several news media websites</a>. In early March 2022, OONI published a <a href="https://ooni.org/post/2022-russia-blocks-amid-ru-ua-conflict/">report</a> documenting these blocks, as well as the <a href="https://ooni.org/post/2022-russia-blocks-amid-ru-ua-conflict/#blocked-website-about-captured-and-killed-russian-soldiers">blocking of a site</a> (200rf.com) that shares information about captured and killed Russian soldiers in Ukraine. OONI also reported that Russian ISPs started <a href="https://ooni.org/post/2022-russia-blocks-amid-ru-ua-conflict/#twitter-throttled">throttling access to Twitter</a> on 26th February 2022, and switched to <a href="https://ooni.org/post/2022-russia-blocks-amid-ru-ua-conflict/#twitter-and-facebook-blocked">blocking</a> it by 4th March 2022 – at which point, they also started <a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/search?since=2022-02-04&until=2022-03-07&failure=false&domain=www.facebook.com&probe_cc=RU&only=anomalies">blocking access to Facebook</a>.</p></description></item><item><title>Ethiopia: Ongoing blocking of social media</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2023-ethiopia-blocks-social-media/</link><pubDate>Wed, 15 Feb 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2023-ethiopia-blocks-social-media/</guid><description><p>On 9th February 2023, amid church split tensions and calls for
anti-government protests, access to social media platforms (TikTok,
Facebook, Telegram) was <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/ethiopias-social-media-blocked-amid-church-split-tensions/2023/02/10/15781c44-a93d-11ed-b2a3-edb05ee0e313_story.html">reportedly blocked</a>
in Ethiopia. Access Now also published a
<a href="https://www.accessnow.org/ethiopia-social-media-protest/">statement</a>
urging authorities in Ethiopia to stop blocking access to social media.</p>
<p>OONI data collected from Ethiopia provides signals of these blocks.
Specifically, OONI data shows the ongoing blocking of
<a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=ET&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.facebook.com&since=2023-01-11&until=2023-02-15&axis_x=measurement_start_day">Facebook</a>
and
<a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=ET&test_name=telegram&since=2023-01-11&until=2023-02-15&axis_x=measurement_start_day">Telegram</a>
(since 9th February 2023) and
<a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=ET&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.youtube.com&since=2023-01-11&until=2023-02-15&axis_x=measurement_start_day">YouTube</a>
(since 10th February 2023).</p>
<ul>
<li>
<p><a href="https://ooni.github.io/post/2023-ethiopia-blocks-social-media/#blocking-of-facebook">Blocking of Facebook</a></p></description></item><item><title>Pakistan: Blocking of Wikipedia and Deutsche Welle (DW)</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2023-pakistan-blocks-wikipedia-and-dw/</link><pubDate>Wed, 15 Feb 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2023-pakistan-blocks-wikipedia-and-dw/</guid><description><p>Over the past weeks, access to Wikipedia and Deutsche Welle’s (DW)
website was <a href="https://time.com/6253154/wikipedia-blocked-pakistan-blasphemy/">reportedly</a>
blocked in Pakistan.</p>
<p>As part of this report, we share OONI data from Pakistan that provides
signals of these blocks. Specifically, OONI data shows that access to
<a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=PK&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.wikipedia.org&since=2023-01-01&until=2023-02-14&axis_x=measurement_start_day">Wikipedia was temporarily restricted</a>
between 1st to 6th February 2023, while access to <a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=PK&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.dw.com&since=2023-01-01&until=2023-02-15&axis_x=measurement_start_day">Deutsche Welle (DW) remains blocked</a>
since (at least) 16th January 2023.</p>
<ul>
<li>
<p><a href="https://ooni.github.io/post/2023-pakistan-blocks-wikipedia-and-dw/#blocking-of-deutsche-welle">Blocking of Deutsche Welle</a></p>
</li>
<li>
<p><a href="https://ooni.github.io/post/2023-pakistan-blocks-wikipedia-and-dw/#blocking-of-wikipedia">Blocking of Wikipedia</a></p>
</li>
<li>
<p><a href="https://ooni.github.io/post/2023-pakistan-blocks-wikipedia-and-dw/#conclusion">Conclusion</a></p></description></item><item><title>Turkey: Throttling and DNS blocking of Twitter following deadly earthquake</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2023-turkey-throttling-blocking-twitter/</link><pubDate>Wed, 15 Feb 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2023-turkey-throttling-blocking-twitter/</guid><description><p>On 6th February 2023, a <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/02/13/middleeast/turkey-earthquake-building-construction-intl/index.html">devastating 7.8-magnitude earthquake</a>
(followed by many strong aftershocks) struck (southern and central)
Turkey and (northern and western) Syria, resulting in more than 36,000
deaths.</p>
<p>In the aftermath of the earthquake (on 8th February 2023), access to
Twitter was
<a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2023/02/08/tech/turkey-twitter-restriction/index.html">reportedly</a>
temporarily restricted. OONI data collected from Turkey provides
evidence that the block was implemented through targeted throttling and
DNS interference.</p>
<p>The following
<a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?probe_cc=TR&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=twitter.com&since=2023-01-09&until=2023-02-10&axis_x=measurement_start_day">chart</a>
aggregates OONI measurement coverage from the testing of Twitter
(<code>twitter.com</code>) on multiple networks in Turkey between 9th January
2023 to 9th February 2023.</p></description></item><item><title>iMAP 2022: New Research Reports on Internet Censorship in 8 Asian countries</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-imap-8-research-reports-southeast-asia/</link><pubDate>Fri, 23 Dec 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-imap-8-research-reports-southeast-asia/</guid><description><p>On 21st December 2022, our long-term partner, <a href="https://ooni.org/partners/sinar-project/">Sinar Project</a>, published <strong><a href="https://imap.sinarproject.org/reports/2022">8 new research reports</a></strong> on
internet censorship in Southeast Asia and Hong Kong (China) in collaboration with their
<a href="https://imap.sinarproject.org/">Internet Monitoring and Action Project (iMAP)</a> partners. We are particularly
excited about these reports as they make use of <a href="https://ooni.org/data">OONI data</a>!</p>
<p><a href="https://imap.sinarproject.org/about">Internet Monitoring Action Project (iMAP)</a> aims to establish regional
and in-country networks that monitor network interference and
restrictions to the freedom of expression online in 8 countries:
Myanmar, Cambodia, Hong Kong (China), Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines,
Thailand, and Vietnam.</p></description></item><item><title>iMAP State of Internet Censorship Report 2022 - Cambodia</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-state-of-internet-censorship-cambodia/</link><pubDate>Fri, 23 Dec 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-state-of-internet-censorship-cambodia/</guid><description><p><a href="https://imap.sinarproject.org/reports/2022/imap-state-of-internet-censorship-country-report-2022-cambodia/2022-cambodia-translation">បកប្រែជាភាសាខ្មែរ</a></p>
<ul>
<li>
<p>News and other websites are periodically blocked in Cambodia, particularly those that disseminate information that could be perceived as a threat to the ruling government.<sup id="fnref:1"><a href="#fn:1" class="footnote-ref" role="doc-noteref">1</a></sup> In July 2018, the government ordered internet service providers (ISPs) to block at least 15 news websites during the country’s election.<sup id="fnref:2"><a href="#fn:2" class="footnote-ref" role="doc-noteref">2</a></sup> In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, the government has reportedly blocked access to news sites.<sup id="fnref:3"><a href="#fn:3" class="footnote-ref" role="doc-noteref">3</a></sup> In June 2020, the Ministry of Post telecommunications (MPTC) blocked six online gambling sites.<sup id="fnref:4"><a href="#fn:4" class="footnote-ref" role="doc-noteref">4</a></sup> In November 2021, TRC blocked 79 illegal online gambling websites.<sup id="fnref:5"><a href="#fn:5" class="footnote-ref" role="doc-noteref">5</a></sup> In December 2021, TRC blocked 9 websites and URLs that posted child pornographic images and videos.<sup id="fnref:6"><a href="#fn:6" class="footnote-ref" role="doc-noteref">6</a></sup> In February 2022, TRC blocked 15 illegal lottery websites.<sup id="fnref:7"><a href="#fn:7" class="footnote-ref" role="doc-noteref">7</a></sup></p></description></item><item><title>iMAP State of Internet Censorship Report 2022 - Hong Kong</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-state-of-internet-censorship-hong-kong/</link><pubDate>Fri, 23 Dec 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-state-of-internet-censorship-hong-kong/</guid><description><p>Hong Kong, a place geographically conjunct to the soil of Mainland China, has been previously known as a free society, endured and still enduring multiple historical occasions. Once, there was no nationwide internet censorship until the latest development that local authorities and Beijing forcefully implemented the Hong Kong national security law in late June 2020. Currently, at least four websites are known to be censored, and a few ongoing discussions among pro-Beijing parties and the government to put censorship up on instant messaging and social platforms.</p></description></item><item><title>iMAP State of Internet Censorship Report 2022 - Indonesia</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-state-of-internet-censorship-indonesia/</link><pubDate>Fri, 23 Dec 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-state-of-internet-censorship-indonesia/</guid><description><ul>
<li>
<p>In July 2014, Regulation of the Minister of Communications and Informatics Number 19 of 2014 on the Handling of Negative Internet Sites came into force as part of the regulator&rsquo;s programme for Healthy and Safe Internet (INSAN or Internet Sehat dan Aman). The law mandated ISPs to block any internet content that is deemed to carry &ldquo;negative&rdquo; elements such as pornography, hoaxes, or SARA conflicts.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>As of September 2022, the Indonesian Ministry of Information and Communication (Kominfo) has blocked over 1,000,000 websites through TrustPositif,<sup id="fnref:1"><a href="#fn:1" class="footnote-ref" role="doc-noteref">1</a></sup> a filtering application that has been operational since 2010 per Ministerial Regulation No 19 of 2014.</p></description></item><item><title>iMAP State of Internet Censorship Report 2022 - Malaysia</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-state-of-internet-censorship-malaysia/</link><pubDate>Fri, 23 Dec 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-state-of-internet-censorship-malaysia/</guid><description><p>It is a codified guarantee that the internet will not be censored except for illegal, obscene and indecent content, while in reality the extent of censorship and its implementation are wider than projected and remain to be explored.</p>
<hr>
<p><a href="https://imap.sinarproject.org/reports/2022/imap-state-of-internet-censorship-country-report-2022-malaysia/2022-malaysia-translation">Diterjemah ke dalam bahasa Melayu</a></p>
<ul>
<li>
<p>The Ministry of Communications and Multimedia (MCMC) do not publish list of blocked sites, however statements were released from time to time to announce the number of sites blocked. It was revealed that 2,195 websites promoting online gambling were blocked as of March 2021.<sup id="fnref:1"><a href="#fn:1" class="footnote-ref" role="doc-noteref">1</a></sup> Between 2020 to July 2021, 960 phishing sites were blocked.<sup id="fnref:2"><a href="#fn:2" class="footnote-ref" role="doc-noteref">2</a></sup> From 2018 to September 2021, 4,068 pornography sites were blocked by MCMC.<sup id="fnref:3"><a href="#fn:3" class="footnote-ref" role="doc-noteref">3</a></sup></p></description></item><item><title>iMAP State of Internet Censorship Report 2022 - Myanmar</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-state-of-internet-censorship-myanmar/</link><pubDate>Fri, 23 Dec 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-state-of-internet-censorship-myanmar/</guid><description><p><a href="https://imap.sinarproject.org/reports/2022/imap-state-of-internet-censorship-country-report-2022-myanmar/2022-myanmar-translation">မြန်မာဘာသာသို့ ပြန်ဆိုပါသည်။</a></p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Blocking of independent New Media</strong>. 112 out of 2,130 websites were detected 1,473 confirmed blocking counts through 6 local vantages under DNS level interference and HTTP level interference. There were 11 out of 31 websites’ categories from OONI were found as confirmed blocking. Among 11 categories, News Media was experiential as the highest confirmed blocking measurement, following to pornography to the second largest blocking counts. Interestingly, within 117 government websites, OONI detects 15 websites were blocked from 2 vantage points of 2 ISPs.</li>
<li><strong>Sign of internet outages:</strong> IODA and Google Traffic data indicate that no major internet connectivity outages have been reported between January 1, 2022, and June 30, 2022. However, on May 16, 2022, and May 20, 2022, there were alerts regarding an Internet disruption and a possible internet outage.</li>
<li><strong>Potential blocking of Instant Messaging Apps</strong>: Apart from this finding period, we found no confirmed blocking in Facebook Messengers, Signal, and Telegram. In spite of this, Facebook Messenger found a large volume of anomalies during the test, which could be a sign of possible blocking. WhatsApp also detected a sign of potential blockings.</li>
<li><strong>Circumvention Tools</strong>: Circumvention tools appear to be blocked after the coup. As part of this study, Psiphon and Tor circumvention tools were detected accessible across the local networks.</li>
</ul>
<h2 id="table-of-contents">Table of Contents</h2>
<p><strong><a href="https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-state-of-internet-censorship-myanmar/#introduction">Introduction</a></strong></p></description></item><item><title>iMAP State of Internet Censorship Report 2022 - Philippines</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-state-of-internet-censorship-philippines/</link><pubDate>Fri, 23 Dec 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-state-of-internet-censorship-philippines/</guid><description><ul>
<li>
<p>In recent years, and with the COVID-19 pandemic increasing people’s reliance on digital technologies and with it the role of ICT regulators, agencies such as the NTC have come under fire for the “politicization” of the country’s telecommunications sector.<sup id="fnref:1"><a href="#fn:1" class="footnote-ref" role="doc-noteref">1</a></sup> This was most apparent under the administration of former president Rodrigo Duterte, whose six-year presidency was marred by the systematic undermining of democratic institutions and countless attacks against critical media and activists.</p></description></item><item><title>iMAP State of Internet Censorship Report 2022 - Thailand</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-state-of-internet-censorship-thailand/</link><pubDate>Fri, 23 Dec 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-state-of-internet-censorship-thailand/</guid><description><p>Thailand, a country situated on the mainland of Southeast Asia, was under military junta for five years from 2014 to 2019. Upon the general election in 2019, the country has been nominally a parliamentary constitutional monarchy, although with lèse-majesté laws continuing to be invoked especially with regard to internet censorship. Adding the COVID-19 pandemic into the picture, the Thai government introduced Regulation 29 to curb fake news, which led to reported incidences of internet censorship.</p></description></item><item><title>iMAP State of Internet Censorship Report 2022 - Vietnam</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-state-of-internet-censorship-vietnam/</link><pubDate>Fri, 23 Dec 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-state-of-internet-censorship-vietnam/</guid><description><p>Swedish Ambassador to Vietnam Pereric Högberg affirmed that Vietnam is making good use of opportunities from the internet, being one of the leading countries in Southeast Asia in terms of internet connection and development<sup id="fnref:1"><a href="#fn:1" class="footnote-ref" role="doc-noteref">1</a></sup>. Vietnam is not limited to using the Internet and social networks<sup id="fnref:2"><a href="#fn:2" class="footnote-ref" role="doc-noteref">2</a></sup>. However, there are still websites with controlled access in Vietnam.</p>
<hr>
<p><a href="https://imap.sinarproject.org/reports/2022/imap-state-of-internet-censorship-country-report-2022-vietnam/2022-vietnam-translation">Dịch sang tiếng Việt</a></p>
<ul>
<li>
<p>Under the authoritarian political system, freedom of assembly, association, expression, press and religion, as well as civil society activism, is tightly restricted and controlled by the party despite legislation recognising civil and political rights in the Constitution.<sup id="fnref:3"><a href="#fn:3" class="footnote-ref" role="doc-noteref">3</a></sup> Certain contents and topics related to curtailing political opposition, unfavourable to the party, corruption, and human rights issues are censored in various ways.</p></description></item><item><title>Year in Review: OONI in 2022</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/ooni-in-2022/</link><pubDate>Fri, 23 Dec 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/ooni-in-2022/</guid><description><p>As the end of 2022 approaches, we publish this post to share some OONI
highlights from the last year. We also share some of the things we’ll be
working on in 2023!</p>
<ul>
<li>
<p><a href="https://ooni.github.io/post/ooni-in-2022/#ooni-team">OONI Team</a></p>
</li>
<li>
<p><a href="https://ooni.github.io/post/ooni-in-2022/#ooni-probe">OONI Probe</a></p>
<ul>
<li>
<p><a href="https://ooni.github.io/post/ooni-in-2022/#new-ooni-probe-experiments">New OONI Probe experiments</a></p>
</li>
<li>
<p><a href="https://ooni.github.io/post/ooni-in-2022/#new-test-lists-editor">New Test Lists Editor</a></p>
</li>
<li>
<p><a href="https://ooni.github.io/post/ooni-in-2022/#ooni-run-improvements">OONI Run improvements</a></p>
</li>
<li>
<p><a href="https://ooni.github.io/post/ooni-in-2022/#ooni-probe-web-prototype">OONI Probe Web prototype</a></p>
</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>
<p><a href="https://ooni.github.io/post/ooni-in-2022/#ooni-data">OONI data</a></p>
<ul>
<li>
<p><a href="https://ooni.github.io/post/ooni-in-2022/#1-billion-measurements">1 billion measurements</a></p>
</li>
<li>
<p><a href="https://ooni.github.io/post/ooni-in-2022/#new-ooni-measurement-aggregation-toolkit-mat">New OONI Measurement Aggregation Toolkit (MAT)</a></p>
</li>
<li>
<p><a href="https://ooni.github.io/post/ooni-in-2022/#new-circumvention-tool-reachability-dashboard">New Circumvention Tool Reachability Dashboard</a></p>
</li>
<li>
<p><a href="https://ooni.github.io/post/ooni-in-2022/#advancing-ooni-data-analysis">Advancing OONI data analysis</a></p></description></item><item><title>OONI Community Video</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/ooni-community-video/</link><pubDate>Fri, 09 Dec 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/ooni-community-video/</guid><description><p>We are happy to celebrate OONI&rsquo;s 10th anniversary together with our
amazing community, who have been at the heart of our work over the past
decade.</p>
<p>Today, we are excited to share a <strong>new video with OONI community
members</strong>, where they discuss how OONI has been useful to their work,
while sharing what they would like to see OONI do in the future.</p>
<iframe width="560" height="315" src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/zrclQ2QZjVo" frameborder="0" allow="autoplay; encrypted-media" allowfullscreen></iframe>
<h2 id="featured-community-members-and-partners">Featured community members and partners</h2>
<h3 id="andrés-azpúrua-venezuela-inteligentehttpsveinteligenteorg">Andrés Azpúrua, <a href="https://veinteligente.org/">Venezuela Inteligente</a></h3>
<p>Andrés is the co-founder and Director of Venezuela Inteligente, a
non-profit organization that aims to facilitate information,
communication and collaboration between citizens and civil society
organizations to create impact from a non-partisan perspective. They
promote, facilitate and develop digital tools, improving access to
information, collaboration and responsiveness, empowering organizations,
activists and citizens. They fight for the rights of Venezuelans online
and offline.</p></description></item><item><title>Highlights: 10 Years of OONI</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/highlights-10-years-of-ooni/</link><pubDate>Mon, 05 Dec 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/highlights-10-years-of-ooni/</guid><description><div>
<a href="https://ooni.github.io/post/highlights-10-years-of-ooni/images/01.png">
<img
src="https://ooni.github.io/post/highlights-10-years-of-ooni/images/01_hu11060568953675838338.png"
srcset="https://ooni.github.io/post/highlights-10-years-of-ooni/images/01_hu2671249911654719631.png 2x"
/>
</a>
</div>
<p>Today is OONI’s 10th anniversary!</p>
<p>As of today, 10 years ago, the first OONI measurement was published.
Today, 10 years later, <a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/">more than a billion OONI measurements</a> have been published, shedding
light on <a href="https://ooni.org/reports/">internet censorship</a> worldwide.</p>
<p>In this post, we share some <strong>OONI highlights from the past 10 years</strong>,
as well as some of our future plans.</p>
<p>You can start off by getting a glimpse of “OONI in 10 years” through the
following animation, which shares some highlights from the past decade.</p></description></item><item><title>Technical multi-stakeholder report on Internet shutdowns: The case of Iran amid autumn 2022 protests</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-iran-technical-multistakeholder-report/</link><pubDate>Tue, 29 Nov 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-iran-technical-multistakeholder-report/</guid><description><ul>
<li><strong>Coordinators:</strong> OONI, ISOC</li>
<li><strong>Contributors:</strong> <a href="https://ooni.org/">OONI</a>, <a href="https://ioda.inetintel.cc.gatech.edu/">IODA</a>, <a href="https://www.measurementlab.net/">Measurement Lab (M-Lab)</a>, <a href="https://www.cloudflare.com/">Cloudflare</a>, <a href="https://www.kentik.com/">Kentik</a>, <a href="https://censoredplanet.org/">Censored Planet</a>, <a href="https://www.internetsociety.org/">ISOC</a>, <a href="https://www.article19.org/">Article19</a></li>
<li><strong>Facilitators:</strong> European Commission, United States</li>
</ul>
<a class="ooni-btn" href="https://ooni.github.io/documents/OONI-Iran-multi-stakeholder-report.pdf">Download in PDF</a>
<p>This report shares empirical technical findings on the recent Internet
shutdown events that emerged in Iran following the death of Jhina
(Mahsa) Amini in September 2022. The report is intended to be the first
among a series of multi-stakeholder reports aimed at shedding light on
what is becoming a widespread and increasingly sophisticated practice of
certain governments around the world. The stakeholders participating in
the report share a concern about the global trend in Internet shutdowns,
but are contributing to the analysis only on the basis of their
technical expertise.</p></description></item><item><title>Join the 10th Ooniversary Events!</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/10th-ooniversary-events/</link><pubDate>Thu, 24 Nov 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/10th-ooniversary-events/</guid><description><div>
<a href="https://ooni.github.io/post/10th-ooniversary-events/images/ooniversary.jpg">
<img
src="https://ooni.github.io/post/10th-ooniversary-events/images/ooniversary_hu6664003398305905779.jpg"
srcset="https://ooni.github.io/post/10th-ooniversary-events/images/ooniversary_hu9430410147315059057.jpg 2x"
title="10th Ooniversary"
alt="10th Ooniversary"
/>
</a>
</div>
<a class="youtube-subscribe" href="https://www.youtube.com/c/OONIorg?sub_confirmation=1">
Subscribe on YouTube
</a>
<p>You’re invited to join us for the celebration of OONI’s 10th
anniversary!</p>
<p>To share OONI highlights from the last 10 years, as well as how
community members have used OONI tools and data as part of their work,
we’ll be hosting <strong>2 live-streamed events</strong>:</p>
<ul>
<li>
<p><strong>OONI Highlights</strong>:</p>
<ul>
<li>
<p>Date and time: <strong>5th December 2022 at 14:00 UTC</strong> (1 hour event)</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>Location: Live-streamed on <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f4D4gq9TBMg">OONI YouTube channel</a></p></description></item><item><title>Survey: Help shape OONI’s strategic priorities</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-survey-ooni-strategic-priorities/</link><pubDate>Thu, 20 Oct 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-survey-ooni-strategic-priorities/</guid><description><p>OONI will celebrate its 10th anniversary on 5th December 2022!</p>
<p>This is a time for celebration, but also a time for reflection: What
worked well? What should we improve? What should we do differently going
forward?</p>
<p>The OONI community has been at the heart of our work over the past
decade, and so we invite our community to help shape OONI’s strategic
priorities for the future.</p>
<p>Please take a few minutes to <strong>complete our survey</strong>:
<a href="https://ooni.typeform.com/2022-survey">https://ooni.typeform.com/2022-survey</a></p></description></item><item><title>New online OONI training course launched by Advocacy Assembly</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-ooni-training-course-advocacy-assembly/</link><pubDate>Mon, 03 Oct 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-ooni-training-course-advocacy-assembly/</guid><description><p>We are excited to share that a <strong>free, online OONI training course</strong>
(“Measuring Internet Censorship with OONI tools”) has been launched
today on Small Media’s <a href="https://advocacyassembly.org/">Advocacy Assembly</a> platform!</p>
<p>Through this course, you will learn how to <strong>measure internet
censorship</strong> through the use of <a href="https://ooni.org/install/">OONI tools</a>. You will also learn how to access
and interpret real-time <a href="https://ooni.org/data">OONI data</a> on internet
censorship around the world.</p>
<p>Today, the course is available in
<strong><a href="https://advocacyassembly.org/en/courses/63/#/chapter/1/lesson/1">English</a>,
<a href="https://advocacyassembly.org/ar/courses/63/#/chapter/1/lesson/1">Arabic</a>,
<a href="https://advocacyassembly.org/es/courses/63/#/chapter/1/lesson/1">Spanish</a>,
and
<a href="https://advocacyassembly.org/fa/courses/63/#/chapter/1/lesson/1">Farsi</a></strong>.
Over the next months, the course will also be available in French,
Swahili, Portuguese and Russian.</p></description></item><item><title>Iran blocks social media, app stores and encrypted DNS amid Mahsa Amini protests</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-iran-blocks-social-media-mahsa-amini-protests/</link><pubDate>Sun, 25 Sep 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-iran-blocks-social-media-mahsa-amini-protests/</guid><description><p>Protests <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/sep/17/iran-protests-death-kurdish-woman-mahsaa-amini-morality-police">erupted</a> in Iran over the last week following the death of Mahsa Amini, a 22-year-old Kurdish woman who was reportedly beaten to death by Iran’s morality police for allegedly violating strict hijab rules. Amid the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-62994003">ongoing protests</a>, which have <a href="https://iranhr.net/fa/articles/5496/">reportedly</a> resulted in at least 31 civilian deaths, Iranian authorities <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/sep/22/iran-blocks-capitals-internet-access-as-amini-protests-grow">cracked down on the internet</a> in an attempt to curb dissent.</p>
<p>Over the past week, Iran experienced <a href="https://ioda.inetintel.cc.gatech.edu/country/IR?from=1663279200&until=1664143140">severe mobile network outages</a>, in addition to increased levels of internet censorship. In this report, we share <a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/search?since=2022-08-22&until=2022-09-25&probe_cc=IR&test_name=web_connectivity&failure=false">OONI network measurement findings from Iran</a> on the blocking of WhatsApp, Instagram, Linkedin, Skype, Google Play Store, Apple App Store, and encrypted DNS (DNS over HTTPS). We also share <a href="https://ioda.inetintel.cc.gatech.edu/country/IR?from=1663279200&until=1664143140">IODA</a> and <a href="https://radar.cloudflare.com/asn/44244?date_filter=last_7_days">Cloudflare Radar</a> data on mobile network outages over the last few days.</p></description></item><item><title>Azerbaijan and Armenia block TikTok amid border clashes</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-azerbaijan-and-armenia-blocks-tiktok/</link><pubDate>Fri, 16 Sep 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-azerbaijan-and-armenia-blocks-tiktok/</guid><description><p>Earlier this week, on 12th September 2022, fighting <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-62828239">erupted</a> between Azerbaijani and Armenian troops along their border. Over the next few days, community members in Azerbaijan reported that the TikTok app was blocked locally.</p>
<p>We analyzed <a href="https://ooni.org/data">OONI network measurement data</a> to investigate the block. We found that TikTok has been blocked in both <a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/search?since=2022-08-17&until=2022-09-17&failure=false&probe_cc=AZ&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=www.tiktok.com">Azerbaijan</a> and <a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/search?since=2022-08-17&until=2022-09-17&failure=false&probe_cc=AM&test_name=web_connectivity&domain=tiktok.com">Armenia</a> over the last few days.</p>
<p>In this report, we share our technical findings. In both Armenia and Azerbaijan, we found TLS and DNS level interference of TikTok domains and endpoints during the border clashes.</p></description></item><item><title>New Test Lists Editor: Contribute websites for censorship testing</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-test-lists-editor/</link><pubDate>Fri, 29 Jul 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-test-lists-editor/</guid><description><div>
<a href="https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-test-lists-editor/images/01.png">
<img
src="https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-test-lists-editor/images/01_hu3102870722549096828.png"
title="Test Lists Editor"
alt="Test Lists Editor"
/>
</a>
</div>
<p>Today the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) team is
excited to announce the public launch of our new <strong><a href="https://test-lists.ooni.org/">Test Lists Editor</a></strong>!</p>
<p>This platform enables the public to <strong>review and contribute to the lists
of websites</strong> (“<a href="https://ooni.org/get-involved/contribute-test-lists">test lists</a>”) that are
<strong>tested for censorship</strong> by <a href="https://ooni.org/install/">OONI Probe</a>
users around the world.</p>
<p>Help the internet freedom community discover website blocks around the
world by contributing through the new <a href="https://test-lists.ooni.org/">Test Lists Editor</a>!</p></description></item><item><title>Measuring DoT/DoH Blocking Using OONI Probe: A Preliminary Study</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-doh-dot-paper-dnsprivacy21/</link><pubDate>Fri, 17 Jun 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-doh-dot-paper-dnsprivacy21/</guid><description><p>When you enter a URL such as <code>https://example.com/</code>, under the
hood, your web browser resolves the <code>example.com</code> domain to one or
more IP addresses using the Domain Name System (DNS), a set of
federated servers and protocols providing this name-to-IP-address
mapping. For example, as of 2022-06-16, <code>example.com</code> resolves to
the <code>93.184.216.34</code> (IPv4) and <code>2606:2800:220:1:248:1893:25c8:1946</code>
(IPv6) addresses. Once it knows the IP addresses for the domain,
the browser then uses them to fetch the requested webpage. Conceptually,
the browser tries the IP addresses in sequence until it finds one
that works. If no returned IP address works, the request fails.
Therefore, domain name lookups are key to browsing and, incidentally,
are also key to website censorship and surveillance.</p></description></item><item><title>A Quick Look at QUIC Censorship</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-quick-look-quic-censorship/</link><pubDate>Thu, 16 Jun 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-quick-look-quic-censorship/</guid><description><p><em>This blog post was <a href="https://www.opentech.fund/news/a-quick-look-at-quic/">originally published by the Open Technology Fund</a> to disseminate Kathrin
Elmenhorst&rsquo;s QUIC-and-HTTP/3 censorship research as part of her <a href="https://www.opentech.fund/about/people/kathrin-elmenhorst/">ICFP fellowship
with OONI</a>.</em></p>
<p>Last year, the new network protocol <strong>QUIC</strong> was introduced. QUIC
is a general-purpose transport layer network with the goal of
reducing latency compared to existing protocols. Since the introduction
of QUIC, we have seen rising volumes of QUIC-based web traffic in
the form of <strong>HTTP/3</strong>.</p>
<p>As QUIC usage increases, it has become the target of censorship
efforts. From the perspective of censors, the emergence of QUIC and
HTTP/3 means two things:</p></description></item><item><title>OONI’s submission for the OHCHR report on internet shutdowns and human rights</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-ooni-submission-ohchr-report-internet-shutdowns/</link><pubDate>Wed, 15 Jun 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-ooni-submission-ohchr-report-internet-shutdowns/</guid><description><p>Currently, the <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/regular-sessions/session50/regular-session">50th session of the UN Human Rights Council</a> is taking place.</p>
<p>In response to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights’s <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/calls-for-input/calls-input/call-comments-report-internet-shutdowns-and-human-rights-fiftieth">call for submissions</a>
in support of the <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/regular-sessions/session50/list-reports">OHCHR report on internet shutdowns and human rights</a>
to the 50th session of the Human Rights Council in June 2022, the OONI team provided a submission with relevant
information on the <strong>occurrence of mandated disruptions of access to
social media and messaging platforms over the past 5 years</strong> based on
empirical OONI network measurement data.</p></description></item><item><title>Job Opening: OONI Community Coordinator</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-job-opening-ooni-community-coordinator/</link><pubDate>Fri, 13 May 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-job-opening-ooni-community-coordinator/</guid><description><p>Are you passionate about defending human rights on the internet? Are you
extremely organized and enjoy supporting communities around the world?
We have a job opening for you!</p>
<p>The <a href="https://ooni.org/">OONI</a> team (a non-profit fighting internet
censorship) is looking for a dedicated <strong>community coordinator</strong> to help
grow and support the OONI community around the world.</p>
<p>The application deadline is <strong>Sunday, 12th June 2022</strong>.</p>
<h1 id="job-description">Job description</h1>
<p>By joining our team, you will support our
<a href="https://ooni.org/partners">partners</a> and global community of human
rights defenders to measure and fight internet censorship. Our community
is at the heart of our work, and you will play an important role in
helping to ensure that our tools meet the needs of our community.</p></description></item><item><title>New Launch: OONI Measurement Aggregation Toolkit (MAT)</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-ooni-mat/</link><pubDate>Tue, 12 Apr 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-ooni-mat/</guid><description><div>
<a href="https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-ooni-mat/images/01.png">
<img
src="https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-ooni-mat/images/01_hu12525868713435091778.png"
srcset="https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-ooni-mat/images/01_hu11932821530926714788.png 2x"
title="MAT"
alt="MAT"
/>
</a>
</div>
<p>Today the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) team is
thrilled to announce the public launch of the <strong><a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat">OONI Measurement Aggregation Toolkit (MAT)</a></strong>!</p>
<p>The <a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat">MAT</a> is a tool that enables
you to <strong>create your own custom charts based on aggregate views of
real-time OONI data</strong> collected from around the world.</p>
<p>Use the MAT to <strong>track internet censorship worldwide</strong> based on
real-time OONI data!</p>
<ul>
<li>
<p><a href="https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-ooni-mat/#about-the-mat">About the MAT</a></p>
<ul>
<li>
<p><a href="https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-ooni-mat/#what-is-ooni-data">What is OONI data?</a></p></description></item><item><title>New blocks emerge in Russia amid war in Ukraine: An OONI network measurement analysis</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-russia-blocks-amid-ru-ua-conflict/</link><pubDate>Mon, 07 Mar 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-russia-blocks-amid-ru-ua-conflict/</guid><description><a class="ooni-btn" href="https://ooni.github.io/documents/OONI-Report-New-blocks-emerge-in-Russia-amid-war-in-Ukraine.pdf">Download in PDF</a>
<p>Information controls are known to occur during conflicts, and that’s exactly what we’re seeing in Russia following the recent invasion of Ukraine on 24th February 2022.</p>
<p>In recent days, <a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/search?since=2022-02-04&until=2022-03-07&failure=false&probe_cc=RU">OONI network measurement data</a> collected from Russia shows that many Internet Service Providers (ISPs) have started <a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/search?since=2022-02-04&until=2022-03-07&failure=false&probe_cc=RU&test_name=web_connectivity&only=anomalies">blocking</a> access to several news media websites, as well as to a <a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/search?since=2022-02-04&until=2022-03-07&failure=false&probe_cc=RU&test_name=web_connectivity&only=anomalies&domain=200rf.com">website</a> (200rf.com) that shares information about captured and killed Russian soldiers in Ukraine. OONI data also shows that Russian ISPs started <a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/search?since=2022-02-26&until=2022-03-04&failure=false&domain=twitter.com&probe_cc=RU">throttling access to Twitter</a> on 26th February 2022, and switched to <a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/measurement/20220306T202033Z_webconnectivity_RU_51604_n1_oVoIGdnUmlxCWmyR?input=https%3A%2F%2Ftwitter.com%2F">blocking</a> it by 4th March 2022 – at which point, they also started <a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/search?since=2022-02-04&until=2022-03-07&failure=false&domain=www.facebook.com&probe_cc=RU&only=anomalies">blocking access to Facebook</a>. Censorship in Russia is generally implemented in a <a href="https://www.ndss-symposium.org/ndss-paper/decentralized-control-a-case-study-of-russia/">decentralized</a> way, as blocks are not observed on all networks, while ISPs adopt a variety of different censorship techniques.</p></description></item><item><title>Measuring HTTP/3 censorship with OONI Probe</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-http3-measurements-paper/</link><pubDate>Wed, 19 Jan 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2022-http3-measurements-paper/</guid><description><p>Last year, QUIC emerged as a new internet protocol for creating reliable connections and encrypting communications between clients over the new HTTP/3 protocol. Observing the emergence and growing deployment of HTTP/3, we want to enable <a href="https://ooni.org/install/">OONI Probe</a> to measure HTTP/3 censorship and monitor how censors respond and adapt to technical innovation.</p>
<p>We therefore added HTTP/3 support (in early 2021) into <a href="https://ooni.org/install/">OONI Probe</a> (through our <a href="https://github.com/ooni/spec/blob/master/nettests/ts-027-urlgetter.md">urlgetter</a> research tool) to conduct measurements in <strong>China, Iran, India and Kazakhstan to investigate the state of HTTP/3 censorship</strong> in these countries.</p></description></item><item><title>Year in Review: OONI in 2021</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/ooni-in-2021/</link><pubDate>Mon, 27 Dec 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/ooni-in-2021/</guid><description><p>In light of the ongoing global <a href="https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019">COVID-19 pandemic</a>,
2021 continued to be a challenging year for everyone.</p>
<p>Yet, several exciting things happened in the censorship measurement
world. In this post, we share some OONI highlights from 2021, as well as
some upcoming OONI projects for 2022!</p>
<ul>
<li>
<p><a href="https://ooni.github.io/post/ooni-in-2021/#ooni-probe">OONI Probe</a></p>
<ul>
<li>
<p><a href="https://ooni.github.io/post/ooni-in-2021/#automated-ooni-probe-testing">Automated OONI Probe testing</a></p>
</li>
<li>
<p><a href="https://ooni.github.io/post/ooni-in-2021/#new-debian-package-for-ooni-probe">New Debian package for OONI Probe</a></p>
</li>
<li>
<p><a href="https://ooni.github.io/post/ooni-in-2021/#new-ooni-probe-command-line-interface-for-linux-and-macos">New OONI Probe Command Line Interface for Linux and macOS</a></p>
</li>
<li>
<p><a href="https://ooni.github.io/post/ooni-in-2021/#new-ooni-probe-experimental-card">New OONI Probe Experimental card</a></p></description></item><item><title>iThena integration of OONI Probe boosts censorship measurement coverage worldwide</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2021-ithena-boosts-ooni-measurement-coverage/</link><pubDate>Mon, 20 Dec 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2021-ithena-boosts-ooni-measurement-coverage/</guid><description><p>Over the last months, the <a href="https://root.ithena.net/">iThena</a> project
<a href="https://root.ithena.net/usr/forum_thread.php?id=151">integrated OONI Probe</a> into their
platform, resulting in a <a href="https://twitter.com/OpenObservatory/status/1443944726235856901">major spike</a>
in <a href="https://ooni.org/data/">OONI censorship measurement coverage</a>
around the world.</p>
<p>In this blog post, we’re excited to introduce you to iThena and discuss
how they helped support censorship measurement worldwide.</p>
<ul>
<li>
<p><a href="https://ooni.github.io/post/2021-ithena-boosts-ooni-measurement-coverage/#about-ithena">About iThena</a></p>
</li>
<li>
<p><a href="https://ooni.github.io/post/2021-ithena-boosts-ooni-measurement-coverage/#ooni-probe-integration-into-ithena">OONI Probe integration into iThena</a></p>
</li>
</ul>
<h1 id="about-ithena">About iThena</h1>
<p><a href="https://root.ithena.net/">iThena</a>, developed by the <a href="https://cybercomplex.net/">Cyber-Complex Foundation</a>, is a distributed computation
and measurement project based on the <a href="https://boinc.berkeley.edu/">Berkeley Open Infrastructure for Network Computing (BOINC)</a> platform.
iThena <a href="https://boinc.berkeley.edu/forum_thread.php?id=13966">aims</a> to
generate a dynamic topological model of the Internet, based on
measurements from distributed devices.</p></description></item><item><title>Russia started blocking Tor</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2021-russia-blocks-tor/</link><pubDate>Fri, 17 Dec 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2021-russia-blocks-tor/</guid><description><p>On 1st December 2021, some Internet Service Providers (ISPs) in Russia
started
<a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/search?since=2021-11-08&until=2021-12-09&failure=false&probe_cc=RU&test_name=tor&only=anomalies">blocking</a>
access to the <a href="https://www.torproject.org/">Tor</a> anonymity network.</p>
<p>In this report, we share <a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/search?since=2021-11-08&until=2021-12-09&failure=false&probe_cc=RU&test_name=tor&only=anomalies">OONI network measurement data</a>
on the blocking of the Tor network and <code>www.torproject.org</code> in Russia.</p>
<ul>
<li>
<p><a href="https://ooni.github.io/post/2021-russia-blocks-tor/#about-tor">About Tor</a></p>
</li>
<li>
<p><a href="https://ooni.github.io/post/2021-russia-blocks-tor/#methods">Methods</a></p>
</li>
<li>
<p><a href="https://ooni.github.io/post/2021-russia-blocks-tor/#findings">Findings</a></p>
<ul>
<li>
<p><a href="https://ooni.github.io/post/2021-russia-blocks-tor/#blocking-of-the-tor-network">Blocking of the Tor network</a></p>
</li>
<li>
<p><a href="https://ooni.github.io/post/2021-russia-blocks-tor/#blocking-of-the-tor-project-website">Blocking of the Tor Project website</a></p>
</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>
<p><a href="https://ooni.github.io/post/2021-russia-blocks-tor/#conclusion">Conclusion</a></p>
</li>
<li>
<p><a href="https://ooni.github.io/post/2021-russia-blocks-tor/#acknowledgements">Acknowledgements</a></p>
</li>
</ul>
<h1 id="about-tor">About Tor</h1>
<p>If you want real privacy and anonymity on the internet, the answer is
simple: use <a href="https://www.torproject.org/download/">Tor</a>.</p></description></item><item><title>[Event Report] India, Let's Build the List</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2021-event-india-test-list/</link><pubDate>Wed, 01 Dec 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2021-event-india-test-list/</guid><description><hr>
<p>This is a <strong>guest post by <a href="https://thebachchaoproject.org/">The Bachchao Project</a></strong>, originally published
<a href="https://thebachchaoproject.org/event-report-india-lets-build-the-list/">here</a>.</p>
<hr>
<p>The <a href="https://thebachchaoproject.org/">Bachchao Project</a> in partnership with <a href="https://ooni.org/">OONI</a> hosted an online event on 9th and
10th October 2021 to update the <a href="https://github.com/citizenlab/test-lists/blob/master/lists/in.csv">Citizen Lab test list for India</a>. The event,
which was called “India, Lets build the list”, was organised to help strengthen
community based monitoring of internet censorship in India. The event allowed
experts from different fields to contribute to a curated <a href="https://github.com/citizenlab/test-lists/blob/master/lists/in.csv">list of websites</a> that
are relevant to India and which are regularly tested for censorship by
volunteers in India.</p></description></item><item><title>Why Collaboration and Transparency is Key to Internet Measurement</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2021-internet-measurements-collaboration-transparency/</link><pubDate>Tue, 30 Nov 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2021-internet-measurements-collaboration-transparency/</guid><description><hr>
<p>This post was originally published on the <a href="https://pulse.internetsociety.org/blog/internet-measurements-collaboration-and-transparency">Internet Society Pulse blog</a>.</p>
<hr>
<p>With Internet shutdowns, disruptions and censorship events on the increase
around the world, tracking where such events are happening and gathering
evidence to help in the fight against them is becoming more and more
important.</p>
<p>Tracking these events is crucial because of the impact they have on society and
the economy. When social media apps are blocked, for example, freedom of
speech, access to information, and movement-building is hampered. When access
to the Internet is shut down completely, people may not have access to vital
services or be able to work and study.</p></description></item><item><title>A multi-perspective view of Internet censorship in Myanmar</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2021-multiperspective-view-internet-censorship-myanmar/</link><pubDate>Thu, 11 Nov 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2021-multiperspective-view-internet-censorship-myanmar/</guid><description><p>In the wake of a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-55882489">military coup</a> in February 2021,
Myanmar experienced unprecedented levels of internet censorship.</p>
<p>In response, we collaborated with CAIDA’s <a href="https://ooni.org/partners/ioda/">Internet Outage Detection and Analysis (IODA)</a> team and
<a href="https://ooni.org/partners/mido/">Myanmar ICT for Development Organization (MIDO)</a> on publishing a <a href="https://ooni.org/post/2021-myanmar-internet-blocks-and-outages/">research report</a>
which documents a <a href="https://ooni.org/post/2021-myanmar-internet-blocks-and-outages/#internet-outages">series of nightly internet outages</a>
and the
<a href="https://ooni.org/post/2021-myanmar-internet-blocks-and-outages/#findings">blocking</a>
of social media, Wikipedia, and circumvention tool sites in Myanmar
following the military coup.</p>
<p>In the months that followed, we continued to examine internet censorship
in Myanmar quite closely. We collaborated with
<a href="https://ioda.caida.org/">IODA</a>, <a href="https://www.kentik.com/">Kentik</a>,
and other researchers from <a href="https://ucsd.edu/">UC San Diego</a> and the
<a href="https://umich.edu/">University of Michigan</a> to expand our analysis.
We used diverse datasets and measurement methods to offer a holistic
view into the censorship events in Myanmar that occurred since the coup
and show how internet censorship <em>evolved</em> between <strong>1st February 2021
to 30th April 2021</strong>.</p></description></item><item><title>Investigating Internet shutdowns through Mozilla telemetry</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2021-investigating-internet-shutdowns-mozilla-telemetry/</link><pubDate>Mon, 08 Nov 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2021-investigating-internet-shutdowns-mozilla-telemetry/</guid><description><p>More than <a href="https://data.firefox.com/dashboard/user-activity">200 million users</a> worldwide use
the <a href="https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/new/">Firefox</a> web browser
(developed by Mozilla) every month.</p>
<p>If access to the Internet is shut down in a country, Mozilla should
expect to see a dramatic drop in Firefox usage from that country. Given
how <a href="https://data.firefox.com/dashboard/user-activity">widespread</a> the
use of Firefox is around the world, could Mozilla telemetry be a
valuable resource for the Internet freedom community to investigate
Internet shutdowns?</p>
<p>To explore this question, the <a href="https://ooni.org/">Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI)</a> and <a href="https://ioda.caida.org/">Internet Outage Detection and Analysis (IODA)</a> teams joined forces to analyze a
dataset of potential outage signals gathered through regular Mozilla
telemetry, access to which was provided by Mozilla as part of a relevant
research project to validate assumptions about the data.</p></description></item><item><title>How countries attempt to block Signal Private Messenger App around the world</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2021-how-signal-private-messenger-blocked-around-the-world/</link><pubDate>Thu, 21 Oct 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2021-how-signal-private-messenger-blocked-around-the-world/</guid><description><div>
<a href="https://ooni.github.io/post/2021-how-signal-private-messenger-blocked-around-the-world/images/01.png">
<img
src="https://ooni.github.io/post/2021-how-signal-private-messenger-blocked-around-the-world/images/01_hu6429735702460217004.png"
title="Signal blocked in Iran"
alt="Signal blocked in Iran"
/>
</a>
</div>
<p><a href="https://signal.org/">Signal Private Messenger</a>, commonly used by
human rights defenders worldwide, is widely considered the
state-of-the-art app for private and secure communications. But as its
<a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2021/01/12/tech/signal-growth-whatsapp-confusion/index.html">popularity surged</a>
recently, we have started to observe its
<a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/search?until=2021-09-29&since=2021-08-30&test_name=signal&only=anomalies">blocking</a>
in several countries.</p>
<p>In this report, we share our analysis of <a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/search?until=2021-09-29&since=2021-08-30&test_name=signal&only=anomalies">OONI network measurement data</a>
on the blocking of the Signal Private Messenger app in <strong>Iran, China,
Cuba, and Uzbekistan</strong>.</p>
<p>Currently, circumvention is <a href="https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Android/blob/83b9fbac11868833925f9395364b8167a1c6615a/app/src/main/java/org/thoughtcrime/securesms/push/SignalServiceNetworkAccess.java#L53">enabled by default</a>
for Signal users in Iran, Egypt, Oman, Qatar, and the UAE. If Signal
users in other countries are unable to use the app, they can enable the
“Censorship Circumvention” setting on iOS. On Android, Signal blocking
can be circumvented through the use of <a href="https://support.signal.org/hc/en-us/articles/360056052052-Proxy-Support">Signal TLS proxies</a>.</p></description></item><item><title>Job Opening: Mobile Developer for OONI Probe</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2021-job-opening-ooni-mobile-developer/</link><pubDate>Fri, 17 Sep 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2021-job-opening-ooni-mobile-developer/</guid><description><p>Are you a mobile developer interested in defending human rights on the
internet? We have a job opening for you!</p>
<p>The <a href="https://ooni.org/">OONI</a> team (a non-profit fighting internet
censorship, originally born out of the <a href="https://www.torproject.org/">Tor
Project</a>) is looking for a dedicated
<strong>mobile developer</strong> to work on <a href="https://ooni.org/install/mobile">OONI Probe</a>: a free software app designed
to measure internet censorship and network performance.</p>
<p>The application deadline is <strong>Sunday, 31st October 2021</strong>.</p>
<h1 id="job-description">Job description</h1>
<p>If you join our team, you will lead the development of the <a href="https://ooni.org/install/mobile">OONI Probe mobile app</a>, supporting human rights
defenders worldwide to investigate and fight internet censorship.</p></description></item><item><title>Italy blocks Gutenberg book publishing website</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2021-italy-blocks-gutenberg-book-publishing-website/</link><pubDate>Fri, 10 Sep 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2021-italy-blocks-gutenberg-book-publishing-website/</guid><description><div>
<a href="https://ooni.github.io/post/2021-italy-blocks-gutenberg-book-publishing-website/images/image-1.png">
<img
src="https://ooni.github.io/post/2021-italy-blocks-gutenberg-book-publishing-website/images/image-1_hu17998570920261562788.png"
title="Gutenberg blocked in Italy"
alt="Gutenberg blocked in Italy"
/>
</a>
</div>
<p>Cases of internet censorship (that affect public interest) are rarely reported
in Europe. Yet, <code>www.gutenberg.org</code>, a book-publishing website run by
a non-profit organization, has been <a href="https://www.wired.it/internet/web/2020/06/30/progetto-gutenberg-sequestro/">blocked in Italy since May 2020</a>.</p>
<p>In this report, we share <a href="https://explorer.ooni.org/search?until=2021-09-08&since=2021-08-09&domain=www.gutenberg.org&probe_cc=IT">OONI network measurement data</a>
on the ongoing blocking of <code>www.gutenberg.org</code> across networks in
Italy.</p>
<ul>
<li>
<p><a href="https://ooni.github.io/post/2021-italy-blocks-gutenberg-book-publishing-website/#background">Background</a></p>
</li>
<li>
<p><a href="https://ooni.github.io/post/2021-italy-blocks-gutenberg-book-publishing-website/#methods">Methods</a></p>
</li>
<li>
<p><a href="https://ooni.github.io/post/2021-italy-blocks-gutenberg-book-publishing-website/#findings">Findings</a></p>
<ul>
<li>
<p><a href="https://ooni.github.io/post/2021-italy-blocks-gutenberg-book-publishing-website/#blocking-methods-by-isp">Blocking methods by ISP</a></p>
<ul>
<li>
<p><a href="https://ooni.github.io/post/2021-italy-blocks-gutenberg-book-publishing-website/#vodafone-italia-as30722">Vodafone Italia (AS30722)</a></p>
</li>
<li>
<p><a href="https://ooni.github.io/post/2021-italy-blocks-gutenberg-book-publishing-website/#fastweb-as12874">Fastweb (AS12874)</a></p>
</li>
<li>
<p><a href="https://ooni.github.io/post/2021-italy-blocks-gutenberg-book-publishing-website/#wind-as1267">Wind (AS1267)</a></p>
</li>
<li>
<p><a href="https://ooni.github.io/post/2021-italy-blocks-gutenberg-book-publishing-website/#tim-as16232">TIM (AS16232)</a></p></description></item><item><title>No Access: LGBTIQ Website Censorship in Six Countries</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2021-no-access-lgbtiq-website-censorship-six-countries/</link><pubDate>Tue, 31 Aug 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2021-no-access-lgbtiq-website-censorship-six-countries/</guid><description><div>
<a href="https://ooni.github.io/post/2021-no-access-lgbtiq-website-censorship-six-countries/images/report-cover.png">
<img
src="https://ooni.github.io/post/2021-no-access-lgbtiq-website-censorship-six-countries/images/report-cover_hu14604463933570315610.png"
title="Report cover"
alt="Report cover"
/>
</a>
</div>
<p>Today, in collaboration with <a href="https://outrightinternational.org/">OutRight Action International</a> and the <a href="https://citizenlab.ca/">Citizen Lab</a>, we are excited to share our new research report, “<strong>No Access: LGBTIQ Website Censorship in Six Countries</strong>”,
which examines the blocking of LGBTIQ websites in Indonesia, Malaysia,
Iran, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).</p>
<p><strong><a href="https://ooni.github.io/documents/2021-lgbtiq-website-censorship-report/2021-lgbtiq-website-censorship-report-v2.pdf">READ FULL REPORT</a></strong></p>
<p><a href="https://ooni.github.io/documents/2021-lgbtiq-website-censorship-report/annotated-bibliography.pdf">Annotated Bibliography</a></p>
<p>Below we share some of our key research findings.</p>
<h1 id="summary-of-findings">Summary of findings</h1>
<p>We joined forces with <a href="https://outrightinternational.org/">OutRight Action International</a> and the <a href="https://citizenlab.ca/">Citizen Lab</a> to examine the blocking of LGBTIQ websites
in six countries: Indonesia, Malaysia, Iran, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and
the United Arab Emirates (UAE). We selected these countries because they
are (a) known to serve <a href="https://ooni.org/support/glossary/#block-page">block pages</a> (i.e., pages that
website visitors may see when access is restricted), which enable us to
automatically confirm the blocking of LGBTIQ websites, and (b) known to
censor LGBTIQ related content, based on prior research.</p></description></item><item><title>A brief introduction to OONI</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/brief-introduction-to-ooni/</link><pubDate>Tue, 24 Aug 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/brief-introduction-to-ooni/</guid><description><p>This is gentle introduction to OONI that does not require readers to have a technical background.</p>
<p>If you are familiar with how the Internet works and how it can be censored you can skip <a href="https://ooni.github.io/post/brief-introduction-to-ooni/#the-basics">The basics</a>.</p>
<p>For frequently asked questions and answers, please refer to the <a href="https://ooni.org/support/faq/">OONI FAQ</a>.</p>
<h2 id="the-basics">The basics</h2>
<p>You might be connecting to the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet">Internet</a>
from a <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Local_area_network">local network</a>
or using an <a href="https://ooni.org/support/glossary/#isp">Internet Service Provider</a> (ISP).</p>
<p>ISPs are usually not connected to each other. Rather they connect to large
<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tier_1_network">carriers</a> or simply to a <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tier_2_network">bigger ISP</a>.</p></description></item><item><title>Accessing OONI data</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/mining-ooni-data/</link><pubDate>Tue, 24 Aug 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/mining-ooni-data/</guid><description><p>This page has moved to: <a href="https://docs.ooni.org/data/">https://docs.ooni.org/data/</a></p></description></item><item><title>Zambia: Social media blocked amid 2021 general elections</title><link>https://ooni.github.io/post/2021-zambia-social-media-blocks-amid-elections/</link><pubDate>Tue, 24 Aug 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://ooni.github.io/post/2021-zambia-social-media-blocks-amid-elections/</guid><description><div>
<a href="https://ooni.github.io/post/2021-zambia-social-media-blocks-amid-elections/images/zm-whatsapp-measurement.png">
<img
src="https://ooni.github.io/post/2021-zambia-social-media-blocks-amid-elections/images/zm-whatsapp-measurement_hu4701194345777220979.png"
title="Blocking of WhatsApp"
alt="Blocking of WhatsApp"
/>
</a>
</div>
<p>Recently, on 12th August 2021, <a href="https://www.elections.org.zm/category/2021-general-election/">general elections</a>
were held in Zambia, during which access to popular online social media
platforms was <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2021/08/12/africa/zambia-election-social-media-blackout-intl/index.html">reportedly blocked</a>.</p>